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ABSTRACT 
 
In the early 1900s, industry and new technologies dislocated our sense of selfhood.  Since 
the Industrial Revolution, the world had become increasingly crammed with material objects, 
leading up to when the invention of radio and the rise of electricity perpetuated and evidenced an 
interest in the immaterial.  A similar fascination with magic as expressed in cultural forms such as 
the traveling show and the séance pointed to our new relationship to the object world: the self, 
dislocated from the body, could relocate in objects, forming a circuitous relationship akin to 
electricity.  This phenomenon is encapsulated by the representation of enchanted objects in the 
poetry and film of this era.  T.S. Eliot’s The Wasteland (1922) and The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock 
(1915) make a natural pairing with the films of French Impressionism, particularly Dimitri 
Kirsanoff’s Ménilmontant (1926) and Jean Epstein’s Coeur Fidèle (1923), because these works all 
depict central characters whose selfhood extends beyond themselves and projects into objects, 
animating them and imbuing them with autonomous, lifelike characteristics in a manner 
analogous to an electrical current.  Humans function increasingly like objects and objects begin to 
take on the qualities of living people, emphasized by both the formal and thematic elements of 
these poems and films.  However, rather than isolating human beings in a soulless world of 
objects, this projection has the potential to introduce a new form of intersubjective and 
interobjective connectivity. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Texts and Contexts 
In T.S. Eliot’s The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock, the speaker’s call for a magic lantern to 
“[throw] the nerves in patterns on a screen” accomplishes this projection in the act of demanding 
it.  Eliot gives voice to a collective longing for individual consciousness to extend outside the body 
so that it may be seen and understood, a desire that paradoxically reacts against and retreats into 
the object world.  The works of both Eliot and early filmmakers (with literal “magic lanterns”) 
captured the public’s fluctuating sense of locatedness and dislocatedness that resulted from 
industrial modernity.  My research specifically examines the poetry of T.S. Eliot, particularly The 
Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock (1915) and The Wasteland (1922), alongside several films of French 
Impressionism, Jean Epstein’s Coeur Fidèle (1923) and La Chute de la maison Usher (1928) as well as 
Dimitri Kirsanoff’s Ménilmontant (1926).  I explore how these works respond to modernity and 
industrialization through their depictions of mechanization and magic in subject-object 
relationships.   
For the purposes of this argument, I use the term enchanted objects to describe how the 
treatment of objects in these media makes them seem imbued with a magical quality, appearing 
capable of independent movement or thought.  One component of enchanted objects is that they 
are often personified or anthropomorphized through formal elements in film and poetry.  In terms 
of their aesthetics, many of these objects have mechanized components that bring to mind the 
factory, the magic show, and the cinema, all of which in some way used mechanized devices 
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capable of autonomous movement.  But most importantly, the way these objects function in 
relation to subjects is the crucial feature that marks them as enchanted.  When the subject gazes 
upon the object world, she reconstitutes the object, seeing it as alive or friendly or menacing.  The 
object, in turn, reconstitutes the subject.  Surrounded by objects charged with their own unique 
presence, the subject feels happy or sad in resonance with the objects, thrust into chaos by an 
exterior world that she sees as chaotic or newly arranged in an orderly manner upon viewing a set 
of spoons neatly arranged in a drawer.  She feels her own body as an object like she feels the 
objects around her.  In recognizing her body as an object, she can care for other objects.  The 
enchanted objects in the poems and films under discussion exist in such circuits of remediation 
with subjects, and through them the poets and filmmakers explore the potential for intersubjective 
and interobjective connections. 
Early twentieth century filmmakers and poets interested themselves in this dynamic as a 
response to a public sense of dislocatedness.  This stemmed from the spread of auditory, distance-
traversing technologies like radio and the proliferation of mass-produced household objects that 
reoriented the spectator towards the object world.  The response to this dislocatedness, in part 
caused by objects, is actually a return to the object world as things locate this roaming selfhood in 
space and actually reshape the self that lingers on them.  Both modernist poetry and French 
Impressionist cinema captured this circuitous dynamic, taking parallel courses stylistically and in 
terms of content.  Their similarities are not simply a case of cross-media mimicry but rather 
evidence their common lineage in culture.  Their common end, in both cases, is a new mode of 
intersubjective and interobjective connectivity mediated by objects. 
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Single components of my circuit—dislocation, relocation, intersubjectivity, and 
interobjectivity—emerge in film theory and literary theory respectively.  Film theorists Richard Abel 
and Jean Epstein, along with literary theorists William Skaff and Leonard Unger, have all 
discussed fragments of the relationship I wish to establish between subjects and objects.  But the 
discourse that discusses film and poetry in tandem has neglected to analyze this similarity.  When 
scholars analyze both poetry and film, the focus is frequently on formal correspondences rather 
than how their similar formal elements are produced by similar relationships to their cultural 
moment.  Film critics speak of “poetic” films and literary scholars speak of “filmic” poems, but 
often they apply these terms in their connotative sense, e.g. poetic simply meaning “beautiful” or 
“for purposes other than narrative” and filmic meaning that a poem consists largely of a succession 
of images.  David Trotter, for instance, claims, “Writers and film-makers were engaged, it would 
seem, in some kind of exchange of transferable narrative techniques” (238).  He notes specifically 
that Eliot’s writings on early cinema evidence “an acute understanding not only of the narrative 
conventions of popular cinema, but also of the techniques it favored” such as crosscutting and 
reverse-angle shots (249).   
The gap in the scholarship of poetry and film results from the tendency for critics to focus 
on the one-to-one relationship of technical devices, rather than performing in-depth analyses of 
specific poems alongside specific films.  As a result, there are few analyses of how the common 
cultural impetuses and themes behind each medium interact with its technical elements.  For 
instance, Sergei Eisenstein’s montage theories illustrate his claims about film by using references to 
poetry.  But it is also important that such stylistic similarities point to historic structures of feeling, 
in this case the sense of dislocation and relocation in the object world.  A select group of scholars 
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who write about poetry and film in tandem, such as Susan McCabe and Elisabeth Däumer, 
consider how social forces shaped both mediums simultaneously, in their cases the destructive 
forces of modernity such as war and atomization, respectively.  But neither recognizes the 
enchanted quality of this modern period, and the potential that enchanted objects have to 
redefine interpersonal connectivity in fluid ways.  I therefore perform such an analysis.  
One key facet of the cultural context that defines the dislocated and relocated relationship 
between subject and object is the invention of the telegraph and radio, which were deeply 
imbedded in the collective consciousness of the early 1900s.  These technologies introduced the 
possibility of perception outside of one’s body: as soon as a message could be transported across 
thousands of miles, people began to speculate about the prospect of teleportation or even a 
connection with the dead via radio.  Traces of this sentiment were appearing with the invention of 
the telegraph in the nineteenth century, but radio’s ability to transport the human voice in real 
time more fully delocalized notions of human selfhood.   
At the same time that the self became less clearly localized in space, a seemingly paradoxical 
fascination with materiality rose.  This was because the increasingly unanchored self sought out 
objects to provide stability, concurrently fetishizing them, mentally inhabiting them, and viewing 
them as separate, living entities.  Hence, subject-object relationships had a circuitous quality: the 
mechanized technologies and profusion of objects that had been steadily filling homes over the last 
decade made people feel less clearly located in their own bodies, but once their non-corporeal 
selves were loosened they could flit between objects and become relocated in things, if in a manner 
that contained dislocative elements.  In a manner resonant with this notion of “completing the 
circuit,” the delocalized self is analogous to electricity, the fluid force animating the mechanized 
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world and itself still an object of curiosity at the turn of the century.  Like electricity, the individual 
consciousness could course through physical objects and give them a sense of life, which is 
depicted in the poems and films under discussion.   
The dislocated self is also symbolically represented in the writings and films of this era 
through the presence of fog, smoke, water, perfumes, etc.  Prufrock drifts with his personified 
yellow fog, Epstein superimposes water over characters’ faces in Coeur Fidèle, Kirsanoff’s characters 
speak through condensation in Ménilmontant, and The Wasteland onomatopoetically oozes fluids.  
In each moment of barrier crossing between the self and the material world, the subject enters a 
circuit with the enchanted object as if electrically wired together.  Prufrock not only watches the 
yellow smoke; he also overwrites it with his own isolation and longing, as it presses in at the 
windows of the houses.  Conversely, the fog also acts upon Prufrock, the only recognizable 
companion that accompanies him despite the opening line’s assertion that “you and I” exist in the 
poem.  The smoke comfortingly curls up and falls asleep at his side, and Prufrock slips into the 
stanza of reassuring himself he is not out of time, saying, “And indeed there will be time/For the 
yellow smoke that slides along the street” (23-24).  If there is time for the fog, there is time for 
Prufrock, and the two have become inextricably linked in a fluid, cyclical manner.  
Of course, poetry and film were not the only outlets for the self to examine its relationship 
with the material world.  The notion of humans leaving their bodies and objects coming to life 
evokes the supernatural, and so this part of the collective consciousness manifested through the 
popularity of magic shows, fairground exhibitions, and the occult.  All three bore a marked 
relationship to modernity through common aesthetics: moving gears, wires, smoke, electric 
lighting, etc.  Different expressions of the same impulse, poetry and film drew on these cultural 
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expressions of magic on several levels.  One component of this connection is the very lineage of 
film in the traveling show, as early works in the cinema of attractions were exhibited by carnival 
barkers and borrowed techniques from the magic show.  Writers and filmmakers certainly 
borrowed imagery from these outposts of magical curiosity—Coeur Fidèle features a dizzying carnival, 
The Wasteland a clairvoyant reader of tarot cards—but the connection runs deeper.  Cinema 
cannibalized magic shows, replicating and perfecting the magician’s tricks, and consuming its 
predecessor only heightened film’s latent aesthetics and themes.  Anticipation and shock, the 
juxtaposition of the beautiful with the horrifying, the sense that objects are alive, rapid eye 
movements from image to image at the behest of the director.  Film crystalized these hallmarks of 
the magic show.  Furthermore, the same techniques manifested in the poetry of Eliot in his 
descriptions of a living, watchful object world endowed with supernatural abilities, a world that 
frequently obeys the aesthetics of the magic show as it invokes the mechanical and juxtaposes 
living matter with decay. 
Literature Review 
Scholarship on modernist poetry has long sought to define the relationship between T.S. 
Eliot, the object world, and his representation of subjective experience through images.  Eliot 
himself threw down the gauntlet for this sort of analysis in “Hamlet and his Problems” when 
argued that good writers must find an “objective correlative,” or “a set of objects, a situation, a 
chain of events which shall be the formula of that particular emotion; such that when the external 
facts, which must terminate in sensory experience, are given, the emotion is immediately evoked” 
(Eliot).  William Skaff claims, “Through his theory of the objective correlative, then, Eliot 
stipulates that the esthetic act involves the artist seeking the unconscious mind and then 
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simulating in his work of art the nature of immediate experience that he found there” (161).  The 
arguments of scholars like Skaff are therefore in harmony with the final aims of my own argument, 
but I take them further.  Instead of merely noting the “immediate experience” Eliot provides for 
the solitary reader, I argue for a new mode of intersubjectivity and interobjectivity produced both 
by Eliot’s enchanted objects and those present in the films.   
Early cinema is all the more appropriate a lens for understanding Eliot’s use of objects 
because many Eliot scholars like Leonard Unger, whose focus is not film, nonetheless return to 
filmic references to explain Eliot’s use of imagery.  Unger argues that The Love Song of J. Alfred 
Prufrock is a series of slides, “Each slide…an isolated, fragmentary image, producing its own effect, 
including suggestions of some larger action or situation of which it is but an arrested moment” 
(19).  On one hand, this seems like an apt, filmic comparison, reminiscent of individual frames of 
film.  But Unger connects this idea to “the idea of isolation, of the impossibility of communication 
and understanding” (19).  He emphasizes the static, frozen quality of the slides, whereas I contend 
there is a living, magical quality to these images: like the film in motion, the static object is capable 
of autonomous movement and even thought, while this sense of motion does not efface its static 
objecthood.  Therefore, Unger ascribes a sense of locatedness to the filmic qualities of poetry, but I 
on the other hand emphasize the dislocatedness produced by these filmic qualities because the 
objects exist in circuitous relationships with subjects like Prufrock.  Such relationships foster 
intersubjective and interobjective connections rather than the “impossibility of communication 
and understanding” Unger emphasizes. 
In order to support my argument that filmmakers like Jean Epstein and Dimitri Kirsanoff 
concerned themselves with depictions of a dislocated consciousness, I draw on the writings of key 
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film scholars of French Impressionism.  Citing pieces by filmmakers themselves, such as Epstein, as 
well as later scholarship on their work from Richard Abel and Antonin Artaud, I reveal the extent 
to which these filmmakers were aware of this dislocation and how it reshaped subject-object 
relationships in their own works.  I then enumerate the formal elements of their works that point 
to this dynamic, going beyond what they themselves indicate and eventually setting these moments 
alongside parallel elements in the poems under discussion.  Comparing the dynamic of dislocation 
and location across media renders it a cultural phenomenon rather than a mere formal technique.  
For instance, Abel’s writings on “astral bodies” are evocative of what I call dislocated 
consciousness.  However, he mostly emphasizes film’s ability to reach outward towards spectators, 
writing, “The camera turned certain actors, for instance, into ‘astral bodies’ whose essence was 
delivered up to the spectator in a direct, intimate, and profound encounter” (21).  I extend this 
argument: not only are the spectators touched by “astral bodies” coming from the film, but these 
dislocated selves within the film interact with objects in much the same manner, just as the real-
world dislocated consciousness of a 1920s subject established a circuitous relationship with 
enchanted objects.  Indeed, even the reversal of Abel’s claim is true: as the film reaches out to the 
spectator, so, too, the spectator herself is relocated inside the film.  Therefore, even as I advocate a 
more widespread sense of dislocation than Abel, extending to characters and spectators alike, I also 
account for a sense of relocation in the enchanted objects present. 
 Abel’s notion of a “direct, intimate, and profound encounter” is especially relevant for the 
final section of my paper in which I discuss the implications of these reformulated subject-object 
relationships in terms of interpersonal connectivity.  It is not merely the immediacy of film I wish 
to discuss but instead the manner in which all subject-object relationships restructure all 
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relationships among subjects and objects, and this dynamic shifted in the early 1900s due to our 
sense of dislocation.  Abel also directly discusses what is and is not poetic about the filmic 
medium, discussing Guillaume Apollinaire’s simultaneism and speculating about the “remotivation” 
of objects, décor, and landscapes in relation to characters on screen in a manner approaching—
though not directly citing—Eliot’s notion of the objective correlative (24).  In a different vein, 
Artaud discuss the magical, at times outright occult associations of early cinema.  Hence, my 
notion of enchanted objects unifies the occult associations brought up by Artaud with the “astral 
bodies” Abel discusses. 
In addition to directing Coeur Fidèle and La Chute de la maison Usher, Epstein also wrote 
about subject-object relations, and in The Intelligence of a Machine he emphasizes the qualities 
humans share with objects.  He contends that the film camera is capable of thought, making the 
camera itself an “enchanted object” in my terminology.  This argument hinges on distinguishing 
the cinématographe from other machines like magnifying glasses and telescopes because the 
cinématographe conjoins time and space, while the other machines offer only a new ocular vision.  
Thus the film camera gives time and space “rhythms of succession,” which Epstein equates to the 
camera possessing its own ideas (65).  In the same argument he also argues for the body’s ultimate 
relativity to the surrounding universe, attempting to dislocate the reader from his/her notion of 
stability in space and time by comparing atoms to galaxies and asserting there is no up or down.  
This notion is reminiscent of Jeffrey Sconce’s observation that electronic surfaces like the 
television screen (and, one can infer, film projection) negate depth perception.  He connects the 
loss of depth associated with simulations to the loss of knowable subjects, writing, “Where there 
was once the ‘real,’ there is now only the electronic generation and circulation of simulations.  
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Where there were once whole human subjects, there are now only fragmented and decentered 
subjectivities” (18).  According to Epstein, seeing oneself in such a simulation on film is 
uncomfortable because it calls to mind one’s status as object.  Once he has destabilized the reader’s 
sense of orientation in place and time, Epstein advocates another mode of truth-telling: “Hence, 
today, the reality of space and time, determinism and freedom, matter and spirit, or the universe’s 
continuity and discontinuity loses its contours, … and tends to become a conditional, floating, 
allegorical, and intermittent reality: all in all, it becomes poetry” (55).  This poetic mode of 
understanding achieved by “floating” through reality calls to mind the flitting from personage to 
personage in a work like Eliot’s Wasteland. 
A small subset of scholars specializes in both modernist poetry and early film, and theorists 
like P Adams Sitney and Susan McCabe have built a framework that I will build upon.  Sitney’s 
The Cinema of Poetry performs a close reading of Ménilmontant, examining the film’s poetic qualities 
such as ellipsis, double-functioning tropes, zeugma, syllepsis, and delays of comprehension.  This is 
an example of the sort of analysis that primarily borrows terminology from one discipline and 
applies it to the other.  Doing so yields a dense technical analysis but neglects to recognize how the 
thematic convergence of poetry and cinema is conveyed through these devices.  Cinematic 
Modernism by McCabe is an exception to this trend.  McCabe specifically analyzes Eliot’s poetry in 
relation to early cinema, and contextualizes both in her discussion of World War I.  McCabe 
writes, “The body of the hysteric fascinated poets as a correlative for what Eliot refers to as 
‘dissociation of sensibility’” (5).  My own argument converges with McCabe’s regarding this sense 
of dislocation, but I identify the causes in the industrialized world and the invention of radio, both 
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of which have positive, connective, and magical elements, whereas she centers her argument 
around war, a primarily destructive force for the subject.   
Furthermore, McCabe writes about bodily dislocation in Eliot’s poetry and early film 
stemming from World War I but construes it as disfigurement rather than as projection from the 
self onto the object world.  Therefore, she aligns Eliot with films like Fernand Léger’s Ballet 
Mechanique (1924) and emphasizes Eliot’s “fragmentary” qualities.  Instead of using the language of 
fragmentation, I use the language of connection.  To represent the difference between our 
arguments, I invoke the image of a shattered mirror (reminiscent of McCabe) and the image of a 
spider web (reminiscent of my construction).  In both cases the subject encounters the object 
world, and then the subject is either broken by the encounter or entangled in a web of 
interobjective and intersubjective connections.  The latter, my conception of this dynamic, 
emphasizes how subject and object are reconstituted through their dislocation and circuitous 
relocation. 
In a manner similar to McCabe, Elisabeth Däumer points to dislocation in Epstein and 
Eliot, and like McCabe she frames this dynamic as a largely negative sense of shell shock resulting 
from modernity.  In “T.S. Eliot, Jean Epstein, and the Physiology of Modern Poetry,” Däumer 
extrapolates Eliot’s brief reference to Epstein’s La Poésie d’aujourd-hui (1921) in one of his personal 
letters to argue the filmmaker had a more profound effect on Eliot’s work than previously 
documented.  Däumer’s primary contention is that Epstein directly influenced Eliot, while I more 
heavily emphasize both writers’ relationships to their historical circumstances.  When Däumer 
does address the historical circumstances that gave rise to both artists’ works, she focuses on a 
sense of “nervousness” and “sensibility” resulting from the overstimulation of the modern world 
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(116).  My own argument recognizes this dislocated energy but goes one step further in connecting 
the various stimuli of the modern, mechanized world to a sense of magic, and I specifically root 
this concept in the cultural response to radio and the related interest in magic shows and the 
occult, which then point to a transformation in subject-object relationships.  Däumer does suggest 
that this “nervousness” required an “effigy” or “mannequin” for emotional release, which bears 
some resemblance to my own notion of a “dislocated consciousness” reaching outside the body 
and relocating inside objects.  However, my notion of enchanted objects and the circuitous 
relationships they form with human subjects is a separate project from Däumer’s aims, and 
ultimately, I suggest the electrical, fluid sharing between subjects and objects contributes to 
intersubjectivity and interobjectivity rather than isolated out-of-body sensations. 
Methodology 
Industrial modernity perpetuated a dynamic of locatedness and dislocatedness, initially 
arising from the proliferation of objects steadily building since the Industrial Revolution.  Subjects 
were becoming more like objects and objects were becoming more like subjects, but then the 
popularization of radio extended this sense of dislocation and evidenced an interest in the 
immaterial.  This prompts a question that seems to constrain our notion of subjecthood: “Are you 
still a human if you function like an object?”  Radio couples this proposition with a question that, 
in an equally destabilizing fashion, stretches the self into a vacuous abyss: “Is your selfhood 
contained in your body if your voice can be transported across hundreds of miles?”  In the early 
twentieth century, these questions also sparked interest in accessing the occult through mechanical 
means and supported the popularity of the magic show.  
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The first question listed above, that of commodification, has long been posed by Marxist 
scholars, and thing theorist Bill Brown draws on Karl Marx’s notions of ‘“the personification of 
things and the reification [Versachlichung] of persons”’ to understand subject-object relationships 
(“American Uncanny” 180).  Brown remarks on how objects can shape personhood, and he is also 
attentive to how objects become lifelike even in a society based on mass production, stating, “For 
even when the commodity form saturates society (even when, that is, we are dealing with 
capitalism), culture works to singularize objects” (177).  Understanding the singularization of 
objects is key to understanding the nature of enchanted objects, which foster a sense of locatedness 
when they cease to be interchangeable with other things: Prufrock’s coffee spoons that measure 
out days of his life are no longer ordinary coffee spoons, and therefore anchor his dislocated 
persona even as his anxieties about aging prompt new dislocations. 
The sense of locatedness and dislocatedness in modernist poetry and French Impressionist 
films arose from and directly referenced cultural forces such as the interest in radio and magic.  In 
the works themselves, the primary mode of characterization is through physical objects.  As such, 
the personas existent in the text hover beyond the actors’/characters’ physical bodies and 
intermingle with the objects that represent them. Like the dislocated voice that drifts over the 
radio waves, symbols of barrier crossing represent dislocated consciousnesses.  Enchanted objects 
become animate through their circuitous relationships between spectators and characters alike, 
assuming a magical, lifelike quality. 
Sconce’s Haunted Media provides a theoretical grounding for how electronic media give the 
spectator a sense of dislocatedness.  He details how this sensation has been described as 
“‘presence,’ ‘simultaneity,’ ‘instantaneity,’ ‘immediacy,’ ‘now-ness[,]’…‘a ‘This-is-going-on’ rather than 
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a ‘That-has-been’” in various texts (6).  Radio and other auditory, distance-traversing technologies 
lead people to feel both an extension of their own bodies, as they are able to perceive what is 
happening elsewhere, as well as a belief in other invisible, living forces whose existence is mediated 
by the object world (be it a telegraph, radio, or television).  Sconce delineates the effect of this 
everywhere-and-nowhere sense, writing, “Where there was once the ‘real,’ there is now only the 
electronic generation and circulation of simulations.  Where there were once whole human 
subjects, there are now only fragmented and decentered subjectivities” (18).  Sconce connects this 
to an interest in the occult by observing that the rising literacy rate in this age of invention was 
fodder for wild speculation about physics and metaphysics among the general population.  Even in 
scientific circles, physics and metaphysics were not clearly distinguished from one another.  He 
traces how a “dream of electronically evacuating the body” arose (44).  He furthermore gives a 
detailed history of occult activities in response to communications technologies, tracing an 
association between media and contacting the dead all the way back to the telegraph.   
Along a similar vein, Listening In author Susan J. Douglas discusses radio’s role in the rise 
of spiritualism.  Two chapters prove especially useful for my argument: “The Zen of Listening” and 
“The Ethereal World.”  In the latter, Douglas writes about a cultural hope for “spiritual 
transcendence not at odds with, but made possible by, machines” (41).  The dislocated, 
insubstantial, expansive self, depicted in the works of Eliot, Kirsanoff, and Epstein, also seeks 
empathetic encounters mediated by enchanted objects.  While these artists do not depict purely 
utopian results from this dislocatedness, the fact that they foster a more enmeshed encounter on 
the part of spectator suggests objects and machines may produce empathetic ends.  In tracing the 
relationship between dislocation, magic, and empathy Douglas and Sconce introduce an 
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alternative, highly connected view of modernity that enables me to nuance the themes of isolation 
underscored by other critics.  Magic characterizes the qualities of this connection.  
Many of the enchanted objects I examine in the films and poems under discussion are 
mechanical in nature.  Neil Harris theorizes why in his book Humbug, observing how the citizens of 
the modern world recoiled from factory life but gloried in the materiality of the machines.  He 
attributes this to the rising interest in how-to manuals, technological jargon, and mechanical 
organization and construction.  He views it as a response to the atomization brought about by the 
age of the machine and the horror of war.  Understanding the workings of machines gave citizens 
a sense of control.  Erik Barnouw further establishes how certain tropes transitioned from the 
magic show to the cinema (and, I contend, poetry), such as the show-stopping acts of “self-
capitation” common to magic shows of this time period, with the magician holding his own head 
at the end of the night.  Not only is this specific image paralleled in Prufrock, but it evidences the 
broader convention of embedding a single, disturbing image in an otherwise picturesque passage 
or clip, common to both poetry and cinema of this era.  Tom Gunning’s “Aesthetic of 
Astonishment” discusses this particular convention in great detail and solidifies the conventions 
between film and the fairground by way of shocks, or thrills. 
The final section of my argument leans on the work of thing theorists outside French 
impressionism, shifting from cultural excavation to an aesthetic examination of subject-object 
relationships.  Incorporating thing theory not only helps characterize the dynamic between subjects 
and enchanted objects in the early 1900s, but also extends the principles I uncover in this cultural 
context to other eras.  One key text is Brown’s essay, “How to do Things with Things.”  His 
explanation of Gaston Bachelard’s “hybrid objects” has much in common with my own notion of 
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enchanted objects as places that the subject can inhabit.  While Bachelard views objects as 
prosthetic placeholders that anchor the subject’s interior world, I however would qualify that not 
only are the objects entangled with inner worlds, but the subject furthermore has an impulse to 
view this relationship as supernatural.  With reference to J.L. Austin’s How to Do Things with Words, 
Brown acknowledges that language does not require references to things in order to make 
communication effective, but he also claims, “things can nonetheless, in the ventriloquism of 
everyday life, people the world we address, the world that addresses us.  The hybrid object, then, 
may be figured as a participant in the intersubjective constitution of reality” (942).  I would like to 
pick up where Brown leaves off.  What exactly does the inclusion of objects do for poetry, 
particularly these hybrid or enchanted objects?  I also find it useful how Brown distinguishes things 
from objects, emphasizing our need to repurpose and rediscover objects, rescuing them from the 
horrors of mass production.   
Vital materialist Jane Bennett aims towards similar ends, and her notion of “thing power,” 
which is “the curious ability of inanimate things to animate, to act, to produce effects dramatic and 
subtle,” provides a framework for understanding how the enchanted objects under discussion can 
seem vaguely, mysteriously alive without the text suggesting they literally possess sentience (6). 
Vivian Sobchack provides the other half of the equation—how subjects become aware of their 
objecthood—in Carnal Thoughts.  She makes a case for “interobjectivity,” which is “a mode of 
corporeal engagement with the material world” that reminds subjects of their objecthood and 
allows them to relate to other objects as such (296).  Interobjectivity is brought about when the 
subject is encounters her own body often through suffering and realizes the body is made out of 
material.  Therefore it is an object, and in this state the body can “feel mimetically the passionate 
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and porous possibilities of those material others and objects that constitute our environment” 
(296).  My argument draws on this claim of Sobchack’s in defining how the circuitous relationship 
between subjects and enchanted objects reconstitutes how the subject conceives of itself and the 
object world. 
Consequences within Discipline and for Interobjectivity/Intersubjectivty 
This thesis has consequences for the separate disciplines of poetry and film and also aims 
to reconceive of subject-object relationships through the lens of a specific historical context.  Both 
poets and filmmakers show an analytical interest in topics relevant to each other’s disciplines, 
reaching towards each other’s disciplines, even if unconsciously.  T.S. Eliot scholars (and scholars 
of modernist poetry more generally) have long discussed the role of objects in the Imagist aesthetic, 
ever since Eliot set that task before them with his notion of the objective correlative in “Hamlet 
and His Problems.”  The visual media of cinema abides by and supplements the impulses of 
Imagist poetry.  Eliot suggested that the interior state of a character should have its correlative in 
the object world, and this is a dynamic film is compelled to enact because of its visual quality.  
Therefore film can provide insight into the same subject-object relationships with which Imagist 
poets concerned themselves.  Film, too, can benefit from this comparison, since from its early days 
filmmakers have aptly—if incompletely—remarked on film’s similarities to poetry.  Some of the 
avant-garde films that self-identify as cinépoems, such as the works of Man Ray and Hans Richter, do 
indeed have poetic components in the sense that they jump from one disjointed image to the next, 
but the more narrative, protagonist-centered works of French impressionism have other poetic 
qualities.  Defining these similarities across media takes us into the territory of subject-object 
relationships, ultimately extending the artist’s representation of objects to understand how objects 
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contribute to intimacy and immediacy in all interpersonal relationships.  It furthermore extends 
the discussion of cross-media similarities, a discussion initiated by the artists themselves. 
From there I invoke Jane Bennett’s notion of assemblage and put it in conversation with 
Vivian Sobchack’s understanding of intersubjectivity and interobjectivity.  I then uncover in the 
poems and films under discussion a mode for intersubjective and interobjective relationships that 
operate through an awareness of assemblages.  Recounting Bennett’s (and Theodor Adorno’s) call 
for a “concept of nonidentity,” I demonstrate how assemblages foster a more honest mode of 
intersubjective and interobjective encounter, honest in that it recognizes the limits of what can be 
known about the other.  
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CHAPTER ONE: 
 
SOCIETY IN SHOCK: LOCATION AND DISLOCATION THROUGH MASS  
 
PRODUCTION AND RADIO 
 
Fearful and Fascinated Responses to Modernity Reflected in Poetry and Film 
The beginning of the twentieth century established a seemingly confrontational dynamic 
between the subject and the material world.  Tom Gunning attributes this to, among other things, 
“expanding urbanization with its kaleidoscopic succession of city sights, the growth of consumer 
society with its new emphasis on stimulating spending through visual display, and the escalating 
horizons of colonial exploration with new peoples and territories to be categorized and exploited” 
(“Aesthetic” 125).  Since the industrial revolution, labor had become increasingly associated with 
the production of material objects; both the methods by which these objects were produced (the 
factory system) and the objects themselves had a dislocative effect on the public, seeking 
situatedness in their constantly shifting kaleidoscope. 
To understand the historic structures of feeling present in the early decades of the 
twentieth century, it is useful to understand how Karl Marx characterized factory labor half a 
century earlier.  In his essays, Marx traces how labor not only estranged laborers from the objects 
they produced but furthermore transformed these living humans into objects, and objects whose 
very existences were furthermore threatened by mass production.  As Marx argues in Estranged 
Labor, “The alienation of the worker in his product means not only that his labor becomes an 
object, an external existence, but that it exists outside him, independently, as something alien to him, 
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and that it becomes a power on its own confronting him.”  Thus, work became a dislocating 
experience, divorcing the worker from his labor as this labor became an alien master exerting 
power over the worker.  Work no longer sprang forth from the human body but antagonized the 
human body from the outside.  Marx goes further to suggest the more a laborer produces, the 
more his own existence is diminished. This is true in two ways: First, his work is not 
spontaneously, intrinsically motivated, but rather, is imposed by external forces, limiting his 
autonomy.  Second, his own ability to meet basic, physical needs is reduced by increased 
production because the more he produces, the more cheaply he can be paid, which may eventually 
lead to his physical diminution and literal starvation.  While the worker’s existence is diminished, 
the objects he produces become storehouses of value, or fetishes, and gain in this value as the 
worker loses his.  Therefore, the worker is “confronted” by his work as an oppositional force: while 
the worker becomes increasingly commodified, resembling more forcibly the world of objects, the 
work he produces takes on an lifelike autonomy of its own.   
I acknowledge this observation as accurate but incomplete, and offer a fuller alternative in 
this and the chapter that follows.  The relationship between subject and object is not an 
opposition but a circuit: the subject, estranged from the world of objects, is prompted to cast an 
anthropomorphizing gaze on these newly autonomous and thereby enchanted objects.  Such an 
enchanted object takes on qualities of the subject as the subject, in turn, takes on qualities of the 
object, and the circuitous relationship between them anchors these otherwise dislocated entities 
(not in relation to the rest of the world, but in relation to each other).  Realizing one’s own 
objecthood can elevate objects rather than simply debasing subjects, and it in cultivating care for 
objects the subject can better care for itself as an object. 
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In the early twentieth century, the labor of mass production was in many ways a strictly 
dehumanizing force, but when the worker left the factory, he or she entered the world peopled by 
the objects from the assembly lines, and the subject’s relationships to these objects was not 
unilaterally dehumanizing, especially in regards to aesthetic experience.  Therefore, in my 
conception, the human subject does not slowly calcify into a statuesque vestige of a living person, 
descending into the hollow objecthood that may be suggested by Marx’s oppositional framing.  
Instead, the human consciousness simply becomes less fully grounded in the corporeal body and 
senses itself roosting in new locations, in new objects other than the object of the body alone.  
Reciprocally, the object now has an autonomy different from that associated with Marx’s 
commodity fetishism, an autonomy that does not menace the subject but instead anchors him or 
her.  In relationship to each other, the subject acts upon the object and the object acts upon the 
subject.  However, the subject is not newly affixed in the objects that give it a sense of locatedness—
the self does not now inhabit a grandfather clock and forever chime on the hour, but it absorbs a 
bit of the grandfather clock and brings something of the mechanical chiming back to the body. 
A wealth of films and poems in this era address this Marxist anxiety of humans behaving 
like objects and objects behaving like humans as a product of modernity, at times framing it as an 
oppositional relationship (for film, in both actualities and comedies, and in poetry as a protest) but 
in other moments setting subjects and objects in a more circuitous relationship with one another.  
An overwhelming sense of de-individuation was a common theme in early films like the Lumière 
brothers’ actuality Workers Leaving the Factory in 1895, in which the steady stream of exiting 
laborers eventually feels like a homogenous mass, so much so that the spectator is inclined to 
wonder if he/she is watching the same clip looped again and again. In a more aggressive manner, 
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Imagist poet D.H. Lawrence, addresses similar perceptions in his poem, “What Have They Done 
to You?” (1930).  His speaker bemoans the “men of the masses, creeping back and forth to work” 
to be “[devoured with] the machine, the vast maw of iron” (1, 4).  Such a description is almost an 
exact match with Fritz Lang’s 1927 film Metropolis, in which a machine literally stretches a pair of 
iron jaws looming out of its monstrous face to swallow workers marching lockstep down a gullet of 
gears. 
The Marxist antagonism between man and machine, like most social anxieties, was also 
fodder for comedy.  Charlie Chaplin’s 1936 film Modern Times humorously dramatizes several of 
Marx’s assertions.  For instance, when discussing the ever-diminishing differences between man 
and machine, Marx observed, “The worker consumes his means of subsistence during pauses in 
the direct labour process, whereas the machine consumes what it requires while functioning.” 
Chaplin suggests even the need to eat—an unfortunate impediment to productivity—could be 
overcome by a ruthless boss, and he reciprocally becomes food for a machine.  First his employers 
strap the protagonist’s body into a vice and force-feed him bite-sized squares of food in hopes of 
eliminating pauses in the labor process, thus fusing man and machine.  Of course, the machine 
malfunctions and Chaplin’s character cannot be mechanized, if only due to his slapstick human 
clumsiness.  Then, in the following scene, Chaplin himself is pulled into the bowels of a machine, 
but the dutiful worker continues to nonchalantly tighten bolts as he advances through the 
spinning gears.  In satirizing the consumptive force of the factory system, Chaplin implicitly 
recognizes the antagonistic relationship Marx identifies.  However, Chaplin addresses it not with 
the horror of Lang’s Metropolis, but instead presents audiences with the mitigating factor of a 
 23 
protagonist whose humor allows him to operates outside the system (even as he is literally sucked 
into the machine).   
Other depictions of modernity in film and poetry also recognized the subject’s more 
ambiguous relationship to the modern world, understanding it through simultaneous attraction 
and repulsion.  At times these works reference a Marx-like notion of antagonism between subject 
and object, but in other moments, they acknowledge the curious draw of modernity through 
circuitous subject-object relationships.  Poet Ezra Pound plays both sides in “The Plunge” (1912) in 
which he simultaneously laments, “I burn, I scald so for the new,” voicing a desire to see strange 
new cities, but he also asserts, “Do I not loathe all walls, streets, stones,/All mire, mist, all fog, All 
ways of traffic?” (3, 11-12)  This tension likewise undergirded the “cinema of attractions,” a term 
Gunning coins to describe early films that used aesthetics similar to amusement parks, often 
confronting audiences with some element of the modern world. Gunning writes of the Lumière 
brothers’ Arrival of a Train (1896), “The on-rushing train did not simply produce the negative 
experience of fear but the particularly modern entertainment form of the thrill” (“Aesthetic” 122).  
The source of this thrill was the audience’s encounter with two machines, the unstoppable 
approaching train and the camera that reproduced its ghostly specter, but the curiosity of the 
camera and the initial jolt of the approaching, antagonizing train only made the audience lean in 
closer, fascinated by the humanoid and superhuman abilities of these objects.   Walter Benjamin 
uses the metaphor of inoculation to explain this attraction: the public, faced with the uprooting 
and dislocating elements of the busy modern world, sees these dislocative features distilled in the 
safety of a film, and they can therefore return to the world with some level of immunity.  Going 
one step further, early cinema and modernist poetry not only reflected modernity but took active 
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roles in shaping the subject’s conceptions of subject-object relationships, emphasizing the 
circuitous (rather that oppositional) qualities of these relationships, because of the distinctive 
formal features of their media.  These formal features harnessed mechanization for the sake of 
subjective ends, accruing an arsenal of enchanted objects that often evidence a heritage in the 
mechanized world.  The manner in which poetry and film invoke subjectivity through 
mechanization is a topic to be addressed in the section that follows. 
Film and Poetry as Agents of Modernity 
Early films and modernist poems reflect their era by frequently invoking mechanized 
formal elements.  For film, these formal features include the physical apparatus of the camera, the 
literal and figurative darkness of film, and the potential for film to disorient and deconstruct.  
Modernist poets, on the other hand, invoke a mechanical effect through elements like irregular 
meters and rhyme schemes, repetition, long lists of objects, and synecdoche.  While it would be 
easy to map a purely Marxist reading onto these elements, viewing the mechanization as 
establishing an oppositional relationship between subjects and objects, I establish how these 
mechanized elements provide an opening to uncover the circuitous relationships between subjects 
and objects. 
Many of society’s anxieties about how new, mechanized technologies remediated subject-
object relationships specifically concerned film itself.  The public’s at times horrified response to 
film gives credence to the Marxist construction of an opposition between subjects and objects, but 
the fact that this relationship is tempered by a simultaneous fascination with the medium suggests 
a sharing between subjects and objects, not a one-way antagonism.  The projector, an enchanted 
object of interest at fairground exhibitions of early films, was one component of the 
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aforementioned terror, but film also fascinated spectators by literally shedding light on an 
immaterial world as viewed through a mechanical reproduction.   
Early films, such as those considered part of the cinema of attractions, were especially self-
conscious of the capacities of their new medium, producing both horror and delight.  When James 
Williamson filmed “The Big Swallow” in 1901 (a short film in which the camera slowly approaches 
a talking man whose mouth fills more and more of the screen until he eventually swallows the 
cameraman whole), he plunged audiences into a new cinematic void.  This void—not merely the 
actor’s oral cavity—is film’s dark capacity to disorient the viewer, to make previously familiar 
objects strange in a way that evokes both primal fears and irresistible curiosity.  Maxim Gorky 
perceived this “monstrous” quality of film as threatening because of how it fostered a 
confrontation with the object (and objectifying) world.  When he reviewed an exhibition of 
Lumière films in 1896, he referred to the medium of film as a “Kingdom of Shadows,” in which 
existed “not life but its shadow, [not] motion but its soundless spectre” (1).  For Gorky, Arrival of a 
Train is terrifying not because he is afraid of being run over but because “this, too, is but a train of 
shadows,” and it does not produce the proper consequences of turning one into “a ripped sack full 
of lacerated flesh and splintered bones” (2).  According to Gorky, film’s horror is imagined but not 
acted out, and therefore it imbeds the horrifying image in the spectator’s brain, allowing no 
physical, cathartic confrontation.  It is manufactured, mechanical life, not life itself.  Gorky’s 
terrifying void appears to threaten the subject, but as Epstein later notes, the experience of such 
voids takes the subject out of a position of presuming human mastery of the world through 
knowledge, and instead re-presents the world as foreign, and yes, shadowy.   
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Gorky saw film as purely horrifying because its mechanical qualities could not actually 
reproduce life, because of film’s incapability.  On the other hand, these mechanical qualities have 
their own capabilities that appear to turn subjects into objects.  Epstein reveals how the act of 
humans viewing themselves as objects sets them in circuitous relationships with the enchanted 
object of the camera.  An example of the filmic capabilities Epstein analyzes is exemplified by the 
Lumière brothers’ Demolition of a Wall (1896).  In the film, a group of laborers knock down a stone 
wall, and then the same clip is played backwards, with pickaxes appearing to suction gravel from 
the ground, which rapidly forms into solid pieces of rock.  The floating dust contracts as if sipped 
though a giant straw, and the tipped block swoops upwards to settle into its original position 
without a single crack in the edifice.  Tricks like these that relied on the mechanized workings of 
the projector furthermore uncovered the mechanized facts of existence beyond the world of the 
film.  Played backwards, the rhythmical swings of the humans with pickaxes seemed to abide by a 
set of laws not so different from the wall they demolished (and seemingly rebuilt).  This suggests an 
inherent and uncomfortable similarity between subjects and objects that could prompt a perceived 
need for subjects to assert their separateness so as not to lose their humanity, but sensing one’s 
own objecthood can also offer an honest perspective on selfhood that elevates objects instead of 
lowering subjects. 
Epstein makes similar observations in The Intelligence of a Machine, recognizing the anxiety 
of losing one’s humanity but pointing to a circuitous quality in the relationship between subjects 
and objects as represented by film.  He first argues the film camera (and, by extension, the 
projector) is a machine not only for art but for philosophy.  Enlightened by the capacities of the 
cinématographe, he criticizes our human propensity to link causes and effects as inseparable 
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entities by referencing the reversibility of film.  We perceive time as moving forward, but who is to 
say that smoke does not generate fire if we perceived time backwards, as film allows us to do?  As 
Epstein articulates, “The cinematograph suddenly describes, with clear precision, a world that 
would go from its end to its beginning, an anti-universe that previously, humanity could scarcely 
represent to itself” (“Intelligence” 4).  When causes, effects, and natural laws begin to break down, 
Epstein suggests this might imply humans have less autonomy than they previously thought; 
machines may function much more like brains and vice versa, culminating in his assertion that the 
camera itself has a kind of intelligence.  In the filmic world, humans function in a manner similar to 
objects.  They are projected shapes, and their actions are as predetermined on the celluloid as any 
of the objects that surround them.  Just as objects can be intelligent, subjects can have a different 
sort of intelligence when they are remanded to their objecthood, an intelligence that sees the world 
with the objectivity of the camera. 
Epstein therefore conceives of a notion of beauty that positions the camera to mediate 
subjectivity rather than negate it.  He imagines that when standard notions of space, time, 
freedom, and continuity are unseated, the world “become[s] a conditional, floating, allegorical, and 
intermittent reality: all in all, it becomes poetry” (“Intelligence” 55).  When one believes less in the 
laws that appear to govern reality, one can experience that reality more honestly.  The opportunity 
to see oneself on film is particularly revelatory, often producing embarrassment and unease.  The 
subject does not want to see him or herself accurately, namely as a flawed object.  But if the subject 
can allow him or herself to be remediated by the camera and projector, by these enchanted objects, 
Epstein claims the subject can release anxiety through the ultimate confessional of the screen.  
Then the subject, in turn, might see the life of the camera and projector and see life through the 
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camera and projector.  Epstein phrases it thusly: “It seems that, stripped of the embellishments of 
illusion, we suddenly discover the incomprehensible: true magic,” which is, namely, the boundless 
insights offered by the profound objectivity of the camera (“Intelligence” 92).  Epstein recognizes 
the mechanical medium of film reorients subjects and objects, allowing subjects to perceive 
themselves, other selves, the world of objects, and the very camera more accurately as they too are 
seen by the enchanted object of the camera. 
Epstein therefore complicates the criticisms of film’s supposed lifelessness from writers like 
Gorky by wedding mechanization to circuitous subject-object relationships.  Other critics would 
similarly rebuke modernist writers for invoking similarly mechanized devices.  For instance, in an 
article entitled, “The Cinematograph,” O. Winter explicitly criticized modern writers, and 
interestingly, he denounces Americans as particularly objective in this manner, with their 
“machine-made” novels (296).  T.S. Eliot’s The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock may at first appear to 
be the work of a machine cramming together lists of objects and miscellaneous nonsensical 
moments, but Eliot is able to depict Prufrock’s subjectivity through mechanized means.  The formal 
elements of Prufrock contribute to this mechanical effect.  The inconsistent rhymes communicate 
circular anxieties with their repetitive nature, as in the following stanza: 
And indeed there will be time 
To wonder, “Do I dare?” and, “Do I dare?” 
Time to turn back and descend the stair, 
With a bald spot in the middle of my hair— 
(They will say: “How his hair is growing thin!”) 
My morning coat, my collar mounting firmly to the chin, 
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My necktie rich and modest, but asserted by a simple pin— 
(They will say: “But how his arms and legs are thin!”).  (37-48) 
The rhymes dare, stair, hair and chin, pin, thin drop hard at the end of their lines, underscoring 
Prufrock’s obsessiveness, enhanced by the lack of meter (the presence of which would propel the 
reader to the end of the line, rather than letting the sentences slip out like half-formed thoughts) 
and the fact that the third word seems like an extra add-on, most ears being accustomed to 
couplets.  Therefore, it is a dull obsessiveness, a rambling list of worries that escape in a 
disimpassioned, mechanical voice.  
In the same vein, Prufrock’s long lists of enchanted objects tinkle out in succession like a 
wound-up music box, as in lines 101-103: “After the sunsets and the dooryards and the sprinkled 
streets,/After the novels, after the teacups, after the skirts that trail along the floor—.”  Eliot uses a 
similar device in The Wasteland, writing, “On the divan are piled (at night her bed)/Stockings, 
slippers, camisoles, and stays” (226-227).  The repetitive lists make Prufrock seem mechanized in 
detailing them, but it gives the objects a quality of enchantment because they are functioning 
beyond their denotative meaning.  In the former example, the enchanted objects share something 
of their essence with Prufrock: Readers can imagine the sort of polite conversation that surrounds 
novels, teacups, and skirts trailing along the floor, connoting a refined world that passes Prufrock 
by.  They connect to the earlier “tea and cake and ices” that contrast with Prufrock’s need to “force 
the moment to its crisis,” and the pairing suggests this oppressively lackadaisical refinement 
prompts Prufrock’s crisis because he cannot relax about his future, and he cannot make himself 
adequately refined to secure this future.  The objects manifest his life slowly slipping, 
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unremarkably, into old age, and so, too, his head might be brought in on one of those insufferably 
unremarkable platters (79, 80).   
All of these qualities are conveyed through the object world.  Prufrock is evoked through 
his own absence in the poem, spotlighting the objects that are in circuitous relationship with him 
and therefore contain something of his character, making them function as subjects, while his 
narrative voice becomes mechanical and thus Prufrock seems more like an object.  When Prufrock 
does take the spotlight, he still manages to be self-effacing by describing himself in the same 
rambling fashion with which he listed the objects, calling himself, “Deferential, glad to be of 
use,/Politic, cautious, and meticulous;/Full of high sentence, but a bit obtuse,/At times, indeed, 
almost ridiculous,/Almost, at times, the Fool” (115-119).  Prufrock views himself as an object to be 
scrutinized and lists his qualities in the same manner that he lists physical surroundings.  The 
purpose of his lists is not to produce a mechanized effect but to reveal how these objects constitute 
his frame of mind.  Likewise, he constitutes them: Their construction as an often unsympathetic 
setting is his perception giving them animus. 
 Finally, Eliot’s mechanized effect is also accomplished by implying his speaker is acted 
upon by outside forces.  Prufrock cannot actively wonder about his romantic prospects; rather, as if 
he is on a conveyer belt, disembodied forces “lift and drop a question on [his] plate” (30).  He does 
not take toast and tea; he experiences “the taking of a toast and tea” (34); he tries to make 
“decisions and revisions” but acknowledges that “a minute will reverse” them (48); and, as a 
resounding example of his helplessness, he ends up “formulated, sprawling on pin…and wriggling 
on the wall” (57-58).  Therefore, Eliot’s Prufrock is passively acted on by an animate mechanized 
 31 
world.  It remains evident at the same time that even in acted upon as an object by his mechanized 
world, Prufrock seeks subjective expression.   
In a manner akin to Eliot’s creation of Prufrock, Epstein creates a mechanized external 
world that mirrors a character’s internal state in his 1923 film Coeur Fidèle.  In this film, the setting 
dramatizes the antagonistic forces facing Marie, Epstein’s protagonist.  Marie has been captured by 
the villainous Petit Paul, a prospective husband of her parents’ choosing, and she pines for her 
lover Jean.  In an unsuccessful attempt to woo her, Petit Paul takes Marie to an amusement park 
and forcefully drags her onto the carnival rides.  Like Prufrock, she, too, is trapped in a rhythmical, 
circular world; like Prufrock, her internal state is externalized through the presence of enchanted 
objects; and like Prufrock pinned against the wall, so, too, does Marie experience something else’s 
invasive movements.  Fittingly, Epstein chooses a fairground as his setting, which calls to mind 
elements of the cinema of attractions. Referencing Gunning, Susan McCabe writes, ‘“Early cinema 
is not dominated by narrative’ but rather ‘partakes of the sensual and psychological impact’ of the 
fairground, suggestive of a kaleidoscopic sensory experience” (9).  Both Eliot and Epstein use 
elements of this kaleidoscope of carnival attractions, as in Eliot’s references to grotesque imagery 
or Epstein’s disorienting carnival rides, but in a manner that always connects the subject to the 
object world. 
In this film, Marie’s state of disorientation caused by her kidnapping is reciprocated in the 
enchanted objects of the carnival, and one solitary enchanted object encapsulates her emotional 
response to the disorientation.  The mechanized setting produces the effect: Marie is caught in the 
cogs of a machine, dragging along on a carnival ride and clinging to her seat against the centrifugal 
motion that would push her against her unwanted paramour, Petit Paul.  Furthermore, she is 
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surrounded by other carnival rides so that not even her eyes (looking in every direction except at 
the gentleman next to her) can settle on a stable object.  Her surroundings are further destabilized 
for the viewer, as the moving pieces of the rides are filmed from below at neck-craning angles or 
dart in and out of shots at upward angles, unpredictably dominating the entire field of vision or 
simply appearing as a flash in the corner.  The mechanization of the fairground could be construed 
as a hostile, oppositional force pitted against Marie, but the setting is not the actual source of her 
agony.  Petit Paul is.  The setting might be viewed as adding to the antagonism, but it also 
resonates with her emotions, not Petit Paul’s, and is in this way sympathetic.  It furthermore 
prompts a sympathetic response on the part of the spectator, who is likely to find the cyclical, 
mechanical movements physically nauseating and psychologically oppressive, building up a desire 
to arrest the repetitive motion as rides swing in and out of the camera frame, interrupting the 
viewer’s attempts to make sense of the surroundings.  Marie can be understood through these 
mechanical objects, and her presence also remediates the audience’s perception of these fairground 
objects that might otherwise appear on screen as a source of youthful delight.   
In addition to the rides, another set of enchanted objects emerges: the set of mechanical 
dolls affixed to the merry-go-round’s organ.  This is analogous to Prufrock’s magic lantern, 
revealing that the mechanized world can be an outlet for self-expression, though Prufrock actively 
seeks his magic lantern, while Marie’s dolls seem like an incidental reflection of her mental state.  
While the rest of the carnival represents the sense of disorientation that has been inflicted upon 
her, these dolls may be seen as Marie’s emotional response from a diminished (and literally 
smaller) self.  One even cranes her head to the side in the same direction as Marie in a later shot 
on the swings away from Petit Paul, and the doll jerks her head from side to side in a barely 
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perceptible movement as if to say “no.”  Notably, they are the only figures that do not shift their 
orientation within the frame besides earlier shots of the actual characters.  The connection 
between Marie and the doll is cemented by Marie’s stony expression as well as a moment in an 
earlier shot when Petit Paul jostles her with his shoulder, and she jerks side to side in much the 
same manner as the windup dolls, limply obedient and facially unreactive.  Therefore, while 
Prufrock seeks a magic lantern as a form of self-expression, Marie actually experiences a 
sympathetic mirroring by her enchanted object. This is a fitting contrast, since Prufrock appears to 
be asking for a camera, and a camera is precisely what has revealed Marie to the film’s audience.  
The formal elements of Eliot and Epstein’s works therefore use mechanization to unearth 
subject-object relationships.  The enchanted objects surrounding Eliot’s Prufrock and Epstein’s 
Marie at times are the agents of seemingly oppressive forces that act upon these characters, but 
they also offer the characters opportunities to express their feelings of oppression rather than 
themselves constituting oppression.  Thus, they can reveal elements of these characters’ 
subjectivities.  Their subjecthood, likewise, frames our own understanding of the objects.  In many 
cases, mechanization—whether in Prufrock’s coffee spoons or the mechanical doll in Coeur Fidèle—
makes the objects seem alive.  The following section traces the relationship between 
mechanization, magic, and the world of enchanted objects. 
Magic Shows and Enchanted Objects 
Just as Marie experiences a simultaneous loss of control and outlet for empathy in the 
mechanical world, in a similar manner the real-life citizens of the modern world recoiled from 
factory life but incorporated machines into entertainment.  This was reflected in the newly 
popularized language of the late 1800s/early 1900s with the spread of “jargon that concentrated 
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on methods of operation, on aspects of mechanical organization and construction, on horsepower, 
gears, pulleys, and safety valves” (Harris 75).  “Recreational literature” came to include the “how-to-
do-it” book (75).  In response to the atomization brought about by the age of the machine and the 
horror of war, a public interest in magic proliferated.  Many people, fancying themselves amateur 
sleuths, sought the satisfaction of debunking tricks in the same manner they studied the inner 
workings of machines.  Citizens reclaimed a sense of control by scrutinizing “humbugs,” and the 
rapidly advancing technology of the modern age only egged on their imaginations to outpace 
actual accomplishments, leading to the result that, as Erik Barnouw puts it, “the magician was 
King of Entertainment” (Barnouw 3).  In context of the magic show, people could have their cake 
and eat it, too, trying to debug how the magician worked his or her magic while also delighting in 
the adeptness of the trick. 
 As Tom Gunning recounts in “An Aesthetic of Astonishment: Early Film and the 
(In)Credulous Spectator,” films were exhibited alongside other traveling show curiosities, and the 
early cinema of attractions reveled in the materiality of the objects in the film more than it did in 
narrative.  In fact, early filmmakers often had personal histories as magicians, taking their stunts to 
whole new levels with trick filmmaking.  Vitagraph exhibitionist J. Stuart Blackton would only 
intensify the sense of magician-like showmanship with his dramatic patterns, seeming to transform 
still images into moving pictures with the power of his voice.  Gunning emphasizes that these 
devices made the world of the film less immersive and more arresting, stating, “These early films 
explicitly acknowledge their spectator, seeming to reach outwards and confront.  The viewer’s 
curiosity is aroused and fulfilled through a marked encounter, a direct stimulus, a succession of 
shocks” (“Aesthetic”123-124).  And because these shocks involved the manipulation of the physical 
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world, defamiliarizing it in the world of the film, it gave the audience a heightened sense of their 
own materiality. 
 The lens of magic and enchantment reinforces what the close-up does for film and 
synecdoche does for poetry: enchanted objects are not limited to inorganic matter but can also 
describe human body parts isolated from one another.  On the one hand, the inorganic can 
become sentient.  Eliot’s Prufrock abounds with enchanted objects amid a dearth of people: a plate 
full of questions, coffee spoons that measure out life itself, and the sense of restless wandering 
Prufrock associates with previously slurped oyster shells lying discarded.  Not only do they possess 
symbolic qualities, but they also appear to be vaguely conscious beings.  The streets Prufrock 
wanders have an “insidious intent” and consciously “lead [him] to an overwhelming question” (9-
10).  Eliot represents his fellow partygoers as fragmented body parts as a means of confronting the 
perceived threat they pose.  His dismissive statement, “I have known the eyes already, known the 
all—“the echoing line, “I have known the arms already, known them all—” suggests that, in 
reducing judgmental women to mere body parts, he may dismiss their anticipated criticisms (55, 
62).  However, in doing so, he magnifies the women and gives them a life of their own.  Their eyes 
can stare daggers in a very literal manner, “[fixing him] in a formulated phrase” and pinning him 
to the wall (56).  Synecdocally referring to women as disembodied voices, arms wrapping around 
shawls, and heads leaning against pillows does not dismiss their power, but rather contributes to 
the sense that he is surrounded by watchful body parts. Prufrock’s synecdochal accounts of body 
parts also gives them a level of sentience that exceeds the expressivity of the whole person.  He 
animates the sea of eyes that “fix [him] in a formulated phrase” and seem to stab him with pins.  
All of the malice he imagines in the partygoers is localized in their eyes, which are far more 
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communicative than the rest of their bodies.  A woman can vaguely reject him with the phrase, 
“That is not it at all,/That is not what I meant, at all,” but her eyes will actively pierce him (109-
110).  In Prufrock’s enchanted world, the power his synecdochal women is heightened. 
Individual bodily members are similarly communicative in Dimitri Kirsanoff’s 
Ménilmontant, an effect that is achieved through the close-up.  The countless women’s hands 
gathering silk flowers provide a visual rhyme with the bustling crowds of the previous shot, moving 
like machines.  This seems to imply that they are merely mechanized objects; yet, in the scenes with 
their lovers, the close-ups of their hands are just as revelatory as the shots of their faces.  These 
prolonged close-ups alternate between the younger sister’s face, her communicative hands, and an 
occasional profile of her lover looking down at his paramour.  At a moment when the lovers 
should be coming together, in the frame as well as in the narrative, both inhabit separate shots.  
The hands are separate too, telling a story of coercion in harsher tones than is conveyed by the 
uncertainty on the young woman’s face.  As she gazes into her lover’s eyes, her fingers interpose 
themselves between her face and him as if to distance her, wiggling across her mouth with a mind 
of their own.  He grasps her arms with greedy, authoritative hands, repositioning her entire body 
and digging his fingers between hers, at times physically picking up her hand and enclosing it 
between both of his.  When he coerces her to come into his apartment, his hands pinch her arm, 
causing her to look down his grasping motion, and she even lays her hand on top of his to stop 
him from opening the door.  As she is pulled into the darkness of his hallway, the only visible 
objects are his pale hands pushing on her back and her fingers reluctantly leaving the handle. 
In this way, human body parts are first objectified by close-ups that emphasize their 
materiality, then personified in moments when they seem to communicate, and indeed  
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communicate better, than the persons to whom they belong.  These fragmented body parts are 
assimilated into a sea of enchanted objects, all of which are equally expressive and imbued with 
life.  Interestingly, Hugh Kenner even calls Eliot the “poet of the alarm clock,” and this is a spot-on 
match for a ubiquitous enchanted object in Ménilmontant (Trotter 239).  The clock commands the 
viewer’s attention through its controlled movements, much like Epstein’s description of the 
photogénie, the French Impressionist term for the aesthetic of movement that cinema, among all art 
forms, uniquely conveys.  Epstein writes of the experience of the photogénie as follows: “I haven’t 
the right to think of anything but this telephone… It looks like an idea” (Epstein 15).  The clock in 
Kirsanoff’s Ménilmontant communicates its “idea” through small yet dramatic motions. 
In its first appearance, the clock appears entirely stationary, although low-key lighting and 
long shadow lend it an element of drama that compels us to pay attention.  In its second 
appearance, the clock is turned away from the camera so its back is visible, and an oddly 
captivating dial rotates (Figure 1).  This contrasts with the motionless close-ups of shoes on the 
floor and trash in piles shown immediately before, but it also contrasts with the frenzied motions 
of the girls frantically dancing and jumping on the bed immediately after.  The quiet insistence of 
the clock’s movement—controlled, easy to follow—is pleasurable for the audience in a way that the 
frenzied sequences are not; it is as if a character has entered the scene who can slowly, deliberately, 
tell us something about what is happening.   
 The clock furthermore points viewers to other moments that exemplify the photogénie.  Its 
small steady motion contrasts with the jumping girls in this instance, but it does have a human 
analogue in other scenes, an analogue that suggests humans and objects are communicative in 
similar ways.  When the younger sister first meets her lover (Figure 2) and after she leaves the site 
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of their sexual encounter (Figure 3), her round face calls to mind the shape of the clock’s face, 
topped by a hat instead of a bell.  In the calm stasis of a prolonged close-up, the audience watches 
as her face unwinds with the same steady motion as the clock’s dial.  This is not the frantic motion 
that so often characterizes the young woman when she is depicted in long or medium shots.  
Instead, in these close-ups, one expression melts smoothly into the next, keeping her face 
constantly and evenly in motion, though that motion is subtle.  This draws the viewer into her 
interior world as they are compelled to watch closely for the subtlety of movement and infer what 
she is feeling as it unfolds.  It is an intersubjective opening in which the viewer must fill in the gaps 
and constitute the substance of what the woman is thinking without ever being sure of these 
suppositions. 
 The insistence that viewers pay attention to the time is also repeated: a brief shot shows an 
insistent hand pointing at her watch (5:47), and the clock in the town square stands stationary 
above the oscillations of city life.  On the one hand, the clock brings to mind the labor clock, 
which measures and enforces the work schedule.  The clock is also connected to the train 
schedules and the bustling world of transportation.  These public clocks invoke such associations.  
The clock in the girls’ bedroom is more complex: it calls to mind the modern world, but the 
prolonged shots take the spectator out of time, or out of the frenzy of time.   It is a reminder that a 
quieter world indeed exists, a world not cluttered by the blurred, crisscrossing sequence of car 
wheels (a reappearing motif) or the jumping girls whose movements resemble the cars.  With the 
alarm clock’s steady, winding movement, the spectator is reminded the interior world of the 
characters, which moves at the same slow, steady pace. 
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 Therefore, the objects in Prufrock and Ménilmontant become enchanted as their capacity for 
movement lends them an air of sentience, but their magical components invoke their materiality 
rather than departing from it in a manner that runs parallel to other outposts of magic in the early 
twentieth century.  The magic shows popular at this time wedded the material and the immaterial 
in a similar manner, and the form this aesthetic took evidences magic’s ties to modernity, 
incorporating smoke, gears, moving parts, and other emblems of the factory.  For instance, Robert-
Houdin’s audience was significantly more interested in his working automaton when he added 
unnecessary, mechanical sound effects (Harris 89).  It seems like a contradiction: audiences wanted 
to experience the immaterial forces beyond their comprehension that characterize magic, but they 
also wanted a very material encounter with tactile symbols of modernity that could be understood 
and puzzled together.  The image of one gear fitting into another like a lock and key concretizes 
the audience’s broader desire to see how it all fits together, in a manner of speaking, with it referring 
to both material and immaterial components.  It reminds the spectator of their own bodily 
dislocatedness, as they seek a sense of relocation resonant with the interlocking gears. 
The apparent contradiction between the desire for the unknowable immaterial and the 
desire for the fully knowable material can be reconciled: showcasing human progress in the magic 
show suggested a human mode of entry into the immaterial, ethereal world through material 
technology.  Neil Harris writes of the “operational aesthetic” prevalent in the traveling show, 
suggesting, “The coming of steam, of railroads, of telegraphs indicated the futility of declaring 
anything impossible or incredible.  Nothing mechanical was beyond the range of Nature’s 
imagination” (73). This also calls to mind David Trotter’s assertion that other immaterial forces, 
namely thoughts and ideas, can “only be known technologically” (242).  However, they cannot 
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fully be known.  Rather than effectually charting out the entire unknown world of the immaterial, 
technologies offer a mode of exploration.  These technologies overlap with my notion of 
enchanted objects: frequently the objects showcased in these films and poems feature gears and 
moving parts that contribute to their perceived autonomy, and the proliferation of these objects 
was linked to the factory system, but they also function in a manner similar to Harris’s and 
Trotter’s theories regarding technology.  The knowable, graspable material world is acted upon by 
the immaterial, and therefore offers a mode of entry into understanding the immaterial.  In 
Ménilmontant, enchanted objects like the clock indeed point spectators to characters’ internal 
thoughts and ideas by acting with a seemingly autonomous movement in these moments of close-
up and concretizing the immaterial, emotional forces within the characters. 
The clock’s second appearance builds on its earlier feat of directing spectators to the 
characters’ internal state by now showing how this state is less internal than we might think: the 
self is enmeshed with the world, including even its own body.  The protagonist’s sexual encounter 
with her lover is intercut with shots of the clock’s inner gears suddenly exposed, much like the 
lovers (Figure 4).  Viewers see all the internal workings superimposed over rushing motorcars on 
busy streets (Figure 5), only to fade into the lovers’ intertwined bodies, likewise superimposed 
(Figure 6). It appears that their affair does not represent a connection between the partners but 
rather a clashing encounter with the outside world, mediated by a mechanical yet sympathetically 
exposed clock.  We sense the movement of immaterial forces connecting self and world in a 
manner that accesses the immaterial through the material rather than negating either the immaterial 
or the immaterial.  The clock’s exposed gears make it seem all the more solid and stable, forming a 
functioning whole, while at this very moment the superimposed image of the clock is collided with  
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a world trafficked by humans and machines (Figure 5).  When the lovers’ bodies replace the clock 
in the next shot, they and the clock are bound up together.  Their sexual encounter is not just the 
meeting of two human bodies; rather, they also meet a whole world of objects possessing a 
subjectivity akin to their own.  Their frenzy is the world’s frenzy (the resonance between jumping 
bodies and crisscrossing cars), and their introspection is the world’s introspection (the resonance 
between a winding dial and the slow progress of emotions over a human face).  Subject and object, 
the lovers and the clock, are not oppositional forces but rather ones that seep into and shape each 
other. 
Other elements of the film, such as the use shadows, expand the points of contact between 
self and world.  These insubstantial shadows, like the enchanted object of the clock, might have a 
life of their own: the lover’s shadow, stretched across the cobblestones, seems much more 
imposing than his actual physique.  In Figure 6 the lovers’ skin appears scaled through the 
shadows of grating, obscured not only by the rushing cars, but also by this second element.  When 
the younger sister suspects her older sister’s betrayal, she reaches towards her own shadow for 
support, even looks towards it in supplication.  And finally, her breath on the park bench is an 
unusually expressive vapor, the only part of her that reaches outside the frame, perhaps mingling 
with the breath of the kind stranger who gives her bread.   
Prufrock is likewise shrouded in a haze that seems at once magical and invasive, beginning 
with a personified yellow fog that serves a similarly obfuscating yet revelatory purpose.  Alone on 
the “tedious,” “insidious” streets, Prufrock invents (or actually perceives?) an animal-like smoke 
that can rub its muzzle, lick its tongue, leap over pools, and comfortably curl up around him.  The 
haze follows Prufrock throughout the poem, imbued with supernatural powers.  He wishes he 
 42 
could tell the women about seeing “the smoke that rises from the pipes/Of lonely men in shirt-
sleeves, leaning out of windows” because that might help them understand his sense of isolation 
(71-72).  He distracted by a waft of perfume from a dress, losing his train of thought entirely.  
Prufrock even imagines some strange, invisible animal asleep by his side, “asleep…tired…or it 
malingers,/Stretched on the floor, here beside you and me”  (77-78).  This personified presence 
may go so far as to hint at the overt presence of magic, and at least provides an abstract source of 
comfort for Prufrock.  Yet the fog’s yellow hue also brings to mind poison or industrial waste.  It is 
one of many enchanted objects in both Prufrock and Ménilmontant that invade the body and 
provoke an experience of the abject, which is all the more heightened by their magical qualities. 
Abject Anxieties 
As previously discussed, the cinema of attractions produced simultaneous feelings of 
attraction and revulsion among audience members, often through bodily transgressions like in 
James Williamson’s “The Big Swallow.”  Such bodily transgressions in which the exterior world 
invades the interior world of the self likewise occur in French Impressionism and modernist poetry 
in the circuitous subject-object relationships.  Julia Kristeva names this experience of simultaneous 
attraction and repulsion the abject, a product of when self and world mix.  It is an anxiety 
surrounding barrier-crossing, a sense of disgust and ill ease aroused by barriers such as the skin on 
a glass of milk, which call to mind the body’s own skin and our fundamental unease with having 
the body invaded (Kristeva 2).  Likewise, there is an equivalent unease/fascination with 
experiencing what was once part of the body no longer belonging to it, which I illustrate by 
mentioning our disgust at finding hairs in shower drains.  Kristeva explains, “It is death infecting 
life.  Abject.  It is something rejected from which one does not part, from which one does not 
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protect oneself as from an object” (4).  One cannot remove the abject but merely pushes it to the 
side, where it remains threatening.  Yet Kristeva also notes invoking the abject is essential for art 
because “The abject is edged with the sublime” (11).  In her work, Powers of Horror; An Essay on 
Abjection Kristeva traces the influence of the abject on literature, and recognizes that the process of 
constantly renegotiating boundaries, abjection, is essential to the artistic process.   
The barrier-crossings delineated in the previous section—the clock and traffic mingling with 
human bodies in Ménilmontant and the invasive yellow fog in Prufrock—produce this sense of the 
abject.  This section establishes how in other moments Epstein and Eliot more forcefully remand 
readers to the bodily unease of the abject with punctuating images of disfigurement and bodily 
invasion.  Such abject moments are logical sites of intersubjective and interobjective encounter 
because the subject is radically reminded of its own objecthood as it encounters the sort of exterior 
objects Kristeva claims we wish to declare is definitely not us.  But in trying to distance ourselves, 
we discover it “is not an ‘other’ for ‘me,’” which leads Kristeva to conclude, “I expel myself, I spit 
myself out, I abject myself with the same motion through which “I” claim to establish myself” (3).  
Encountering the abject uncomfortably reminds the subject of the substance it shares with the 
object world.  These texts provide sites to work out the anxieties of the abject.  Many times in the 
films and poems under discussion, this sense of the abject calls upon the darker qualities of magic 
to illustrate the unease.  Magic, as a cultural force, colored the representation of enchanted objects 
in the previous section, and in the same manner, it has tendrils in this more sinister enchantment. 
The experience of the abject is present even in the historical relationship between cinema 
and magic.  Cinema has a cannibalistic relationship with magic shows due to “the transfer to the 
screen of the magician’s most sensational illusions,” which caused cinema to become “a powerful 
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robot ousting its former master” (Barnouw 6-8).  Initially, these spectacles were associated with 
trick films, but they have much farther-reaching extensions in later film and poetry.  The speaker’s 
sleight of hand in Prufrock frequently juxtaposes the beautiful with the horrific like any good 
showman.  No sooner is the reader imagining the comfort of the mundane, picturing “tea and 
cakes and ices” as the afternoon is “smoothed by long fingers” than Prufrock drops the bomb, 
“though I have seen my head (grown slightly bald) brought in upon a platter” (79, 76, 82).  This is 
a familiar image for Eliot’s audience: in Erik Barnouw’s The Magician and the Cinema, he describes 
the show-stopping acts of “self-capitation” common to magic shows of this time period, with the 
magician holding his own head at the end of the night, a move that emphasizes the objecthood of 
the subject in harsh, abjected ways (3).  And though this is horrifying, it is also the part audience 
has paid good money to see.  They long for the simultaneous attraction and repulsion of the abject 
so as to confront those abject fears that linger at the edges of their awareness.  Because self-
capitation in the magic show was such a hit, the trope of embedding a single, disturbing image in 
an otherwise picturesque passage or clip is common to both poetry and cinema of this era. 
Contrast, revulsion, and curiosity are reliable techniques for holding an audience’s interest.  Tomi 
Huttunen comments on this technique, writing, “The author chooses the most shocking 
juxtapositions for metaphors in order to force the reader to participate in a reconstructive process 
of generating synthetic meanings” (4).  In such a way, shock imbues a text with a sense of life.  To 
be surprised is to feel one’s own heart pounding, and thereby to feel oneself as an object. Also, to a 
lesser extent, the shock within a text produces not an opposition against it but a curiosity allowing 
entrance into the text. 
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Many writers have associated the presence of morbidity in these works with the trauma of 
World War I.  Christian Metz calls film “a prosthesis for our primally dislocated limbs,” all the 
more dislocated literally and symbolically by the war (McCabe 10).  Paul Virilio points out that 
“the nitrocellulose that went into film stock was also used for the production of explosives,” an apt 
metaphor describing the close film’s potential for a therapeutic reenactment of violence 
(McCabe10).  Modernist poets’ also demonstrate an obsession with “literal bodily disfigurements 
and psychological traumas” (McCabe10).  Not only was this a response to the war, but it was also 
an extension of modernity’s mechanization.  The public’s fascination with machines led to viewing 
the human body as a mechanical entity, which at first seems horrifically dehumanizing until the 
fragmented body is shown to be uniquely communicative.  Eliot explores how the body, like a 
clock, could be dissected, its parts set in pieces on the examination table, like his “patient etherized 
upon a table” (3).  This image from the poem’s opening is unsettling: one moment, Prufrock is 
directly addressing the reader in a romantic manner, verbally taking his/her hand, and saying, “Let 
us go then, you and I,/When the evening is spread out against the sky” (1-2).  The next second, 
readers are slammed with a comparison of the night sky to surgery.  Thus, human body and night 
sky become the subject of dissection and examination in a thoroughly de-romanticized and heavily 
abjected manner. 
Both Eliot and Dimitri Kirsanoff juxtapose organic, living matter with decay.  Prufrock 
discusses murder in the same breath as breakfast (28-34); Kirsanoff’s Ménilmontant pairs flowers 
with putrescent black goop (Figure 7), and later, a single pair of well-loved shoes slips into a shot of 
broken, trashed shoes on a garbage pile (Figures 8 and 9).  This frame from Ménilmontant features 
dried or perhaps plastic flowers alongside a manmade glue that will cement them into  
 46 
arrangements.  In one regard, the flowers have become symbols of the inorganic as they are 
preserved with repulsive black tar, but they will certainly be sold for decoration in homes where 
they will seem organic in comparison to the other factory-produced trinkets decorating the shelves.  
Therefore, the flowers covalently represent both life and the simulacrum of it.  Questioning the 
natural order and society’s understanding of it is paramount to the thematic content of the film, as 
the protagonist faces such a perceived threat of shame for her pregnancy that she considers hurling 
her body into the river.  She, like the shoes, can be walking down the street one moment and on 
the rubbish pile the next, and such frequent juxtapositions ask the spectator to question the 
condemnation heaped on the persons society deems abject. 
Eliot evokes a similar image to Kirsanoff’s flowers and tar in The Wasteland, and Eliot’s 
abject moments are oddly grounding for the reader (and not just because he is writing about 
burial) even as they are unsettling.  The very opening of the poem begins with a description of 
lilacs “breeding…out of the dead land” under which worms a network of “dried tubers” (1-2).  The 
abject experience of the moment is heightened by Eliot’s choice of the word “tubers,” a 
phraseology that makes the plants seem alien, somewhere between life and death, creating the 
image of infestation underneath the “forgetful snow” (6-7).  Likewise, the connotation of the word 
“breeding” is not quite the same as growing, thriving, or blooming.  It associates growth with 
production: animals are bred for the purpose of producing new animals, generally to be sold and 
generate revenue.  It is a term associated with life but also a term associated with economics.  
There is something sinister about this plant growth that comes to fruition at the end of “The 
Burial of the Dead,” when a murdered corpse has been “planted” in a garden, and the speaker 
asks, ‘“Will it bloom this year?”’ (71, 72)  The corpse is not only occupying a space between life 
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and death, with the suggestion that it can reanimate in the spring, but it is also somewhere 
between human and plant matter.  The corpse is an image Kristeva explicitly evokes (3), and 
furthermore, it is placed in the ground, an image resembling another abject image, human skin (3).  
This multi-layered abject object represents an extreme blurring of subjects and objects, and it is 
when boundaries are so fully violated that the subject’s encounter with the object world is 
unsettling.  However, the following section’s discussion of radio will reveal how such images could 
be grounding for the dislocated subject. 
Radio Circuitry 
Early radio can help explain the new and circuitous subject-object relationships present in 
film and poetry in the early twentieth century.  For the purposes of this argument, I will analyze 
radio as a medium of entertainment rather than an implement of war, though its history 
encompasses both elements.  The historic structures of feeling surrounding the radio 
entertainment span several topics already under discussion, such as the prevalence of new 
technologies and the rising interest in the occult.  It also responds to and helps constitute the 
sense of dislocation the subject experienced in the throes of modernity by offering a kind of spatial 
situatedness.  Furthermore, the electrical circuitry of radio is a syllepsis for the new 
intersubjectivity and interobjectivity present in these works, serving as both a metaphor to 
illustrate these dynamics and being a literal, historical source of this effect.  Radio enacts the 
experience of the abject through technology, as sound from another place enters the house, the 
room, even the body of the subject, and as such it reveals the intersubjective and interobjective 
potential of abject experience. 
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Radio, as well as its predecessors in distance-traversing technologies, perpetuated a sense of 
placelessness by transporting human voices across the country and transporting the listener into 
the recording studio or the music hall.  This calls to mind what Walter Benjamin wrote in “The 
Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction.”  Benjamin understands the modern 
subject’s mode of engagement with art as a function of physical distance.  He writes, “The 
cathedral leaves its locale to be received in the studio of a lover of art; the choral production, 
performed in an auditorium or in the open air, resounds in the drawing room,” a relocalization 
that Benjamin claims depreciates the presence and authority of a work of art in a positive sense.  
Yes, in the opera, the sound is connected to the people producing it.  It seems to exist in a single 
time and place, with a clear source.  What is more, it occurs in a setting that requires specific social 
decorum: people attend the opera wearing suits and dresses; they sit up straight in their chairs; 
they are careful that their emotional responses to the music should be appropriate to the setting 
and acceptable to their companions.  But the broadcasted performance comes directly into the 
listener’s home, mediated by the electrical box but unmediated by any human presence.  Spatial 
situatedness is established by the connections between subject and objects; the subject is not in 
proximity to the world but rather to specific voices that touch his or her ears. 
When subjects are reduced to voices, or even individual body parts, sometimes they 
become more knowable.  Early radio singer Leon Alfred Duthernoy recounts a similar experience 
in his piece “Singing to Tens of Thousands; Impressions of an Artist during His First Radio 
Concert.”   He details the lonely, dehumanizing radio studio in which he gave his first concert, 
paired with only an inattentive accompanist who spent much of the session knitted myopically in 
the dim light.  He describes the “skinny arm, or skeletonized frame” of the transmitter (268).  But 
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the passage that makes him most nearly resemble Prufrock is as follows: “In my mind I visualized a 
life-size map of the United States, and in every town, every hamlet, every crossroads, there was 
nothing but ears…I could see ears sticking out from behind library tables, bookcases and sideboards; 
the handles were ears, the glass knobs were ears, and they were waiting for me” (268).  At first, he is 
struck by the dullness of his performance and the loneliness of singing to a skeleton arm with no 
applause.  But then he imagines the ears in hospitals, sanitariums, and children’s wards.   
This calls to mind the moments in The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock when Prufrock claims 
to variously know the voices, eyes, and arms of his fellow partygoers.  Even though Prufrock finds 
these parts of humans as judgmental as their wholes, it nonetheless suggests an impulse to intimacy 
in that context.  Individual eyes, arms, and other body parts are only experienced in isolation when 
two bodies are very close and they can fill the whole field of vision.  Both Prufrock and Duthernoy 
synecdochally dissect the humans making up their audiences, materializing the body parts and 
giving them life, and Duthernoy more successfully reaches a point of intimacy with the subjects to 
whom the ears belong.  It is not in spite of, but rather, because of this abject vivisecting and 
personifying image that Duthernoy feels close to his invisible audience while still in the room of 
equally abject skeleton wires, an intimacy he prefers to the warm applause of the concert hall.  The 
ubiquitous ears, some of which are attached to humans for whom he feels great sympathy, form a 
compelling audience.  He can picture the specific, minute detail of the ears, corporealizing his 
otherwise invisible audience, but he also senses the vastness of this same audience “in every town, 
every hamlet, every crossroads” that would exceed the limits of the concert hall.  Like Prufrock, 
Duthernoy is comforting by reducing humans to their object-like parts and uses these parts to 
foster a new intersubjectivity. 
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Radio especially capitalized on the new proximity of the auditory arts with “crooning,” or a 
soft, sentimental singing style that mimicked how mothers often sing to their babies.  Timothy D. 
Taylor observes, “Crooning thus introduced a paradox: while radio was proclaimed as uniting 
disparate Americans into a single culture, the singing style that radio ushered into existence helped 
to create and maintain an illusion that listeners’ relationships to singers and other broadcasting 
individuals were unmediated and personal” (252).  Singers intentionally sang in a manner to 
suggest their lips might brush the listener’s ears at any moment: low, soft, the way a mother sings 
to a child.  It is easy to see why crooning became a popular style for love songs.  When radio could 
produce a feeling of closeness, and as a byproduct produce a sense of placelessness, it also 
conveyed a sense of intimacy.  
Radio displaced early listeners and reoriented their relationship with the object world.  
Bruce Bliven’s 1922 piece “The Ether Will Now Oblige” puts to words a historical structure of 
feeling occurring nationwide in this description of early clandestine radio parties, giving credence 
to this theory of displacement and relocatedness (Taylor et. al 260).  In this New Republic article, 
readers are continually reminded of a sense of placelessness, salient in the opening line, “The taxi 
driver at 181st Street wasn’t at all sure he could find the place” (260).  Emerging from the darkness 
of city streets and entering the party, the reader’s first true visual in the entire narrative is of 
intensely material whirligigs adorning the radio: “The face of this board was cluttered with 
instruments—dials, handles, and, dominating the rest, several hooded electric lights in glass tubes” 
(261).  The specificity of these descriptions throws into relief the blurred, shadowy backdrop of the 
radio party in which no single person’s physical qualities are actually mentioned, with the 
exception of the overalls the speaker imagines on the radio enthusiasts, which evidence their 
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association with industrialization.  In a vacuum of sensory details besides those related to the 
radio, those details that are present anchor readers, who might otherwise be sucked up into the 
void of missing details in the same manner as the radio waves, which “[have] been tossed off into 
the limitless ether which it fills for hundreds of miles in every direction” (262).  Through the 
knobs and dials, readers have a specific space to occupy, protecting them drifting into the infinite 
space, akin to the ether that houses radio waves, which Bliven emphasizes is otherwise vast and 
frightful. 
These enchanted objects therefore demand our attention, and they become the central 
characters of the narrative.  Because readers share an anthropomorphizing impulse that assumes a 
story must have actors, and because we find no other actors present in Bliven’s descriptions, the 
objects develop a sense of agency and sentience.  The phonograph horn emits a “shrill 
whistle…made by some far-off world as it flees shrieking in agony across the firmament” (262).  
Contrast the agonized shrieking of radio with the cool depersonalization of the party attenders and 
it is obvious which “characters” are the more sympathetic.  I remark on the tendencies of Bliven’s 
style not to digress into a formal analysis of his particular writing but to argue his stylistic choices 
emerge from a cultural attitude towards radio that he merely captures in words.  He situates 
readers in the attitude of listening to a broadcast, and it is the qualities of this attitude that 
matters.  We are more attentive to the imaginary imagery (imaginary in the context of the 
narrative) than we are to the literal setting in which Bliven places us, with the exception of the 
technologies that bridge the gap into radio’s abstraction, because that is exactly how radio works.  
A medium devoid of visuals like radio is really all about sight, since it has to work doubly hard to 
provide listeners with a visual to direct their focus—hence, the great tradition storytelling via radio.  
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In Bliven’s piece, he mimics this experience, presenting it in a manner that captures the 
dislocation and relocation of the medium, so we too, like the original listeners, are “listening in.” 
The influence of the historical structures of feeling related to radio on the medium of 
poetry is evident when T.S. Eliot’s use of dialogue in The Wasteland accomplishes a similar effect to 
Bliven’s radio encounter.  It is not the interaction between the characters present that demands 
our attention, for we have minimal information about them and they exist for only a short 
moment in the poem.  Rather, we focus on the content of their dialogue, especially the odd objects 
they discuss.  This recalls the aforementioned corpse at end of “The Burial of the Dead,” an abject 
moment that anchors the reader in a concrete moment even as if provokes bodily unease.  The 
speaker in this scene stands on London Bridge in a Dantesque crowd of meandering, possibly 
deceased souls.  We have a description neither of the speaker nor of the recipient of his 
apostrophic speech—all we know is he is named Stetson and fought in the Punic Wars, details we 
gather from the speaker’s exclamation.  He might not even really be present, a likely assumption 
given that the wars happened in 260 B.C.  But then Eliot’s speaker demands, “That corpse you 
planted last year in your garden,/Has it begun to sprout?  Will it bloom this year?” (69-72).  
Suddenly, the featureless characters and drifting mob, both of which contribute to a sense of 
placelessness, give way to the strange and therefore grounding image of a corpse sprouting with plants, 
an image that was mentioned as an example of the abject the end of the previous section.  (When 
an image is unusual, it seems to exist in a single place and time, whereas commonplace images 
blend into their ubiquitous doppelgangers).  There is a verbal quality to this poem, as Eliot artfully 
inserts dialogue that has the quirks of realistic speech patterns to contrast with the unrealistic 
content, but because it is verbal, it is also intensely visual in much the same manner as radio.  
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Striking imagery like a corpse growing into a plant locates us in a vividly distinct, though 
imaginary, moment.  The verbal quality of Eliot’s poetry evidences a connection to radio, and 
exploring these connections reveals the possibilities of the poem’s abject qualities. 
This link between Eliot and the historicity of radio is even more apparent in Part II, “A 
Game of Chess.”  Here, a woman appears to have a conversation with her radio, which is suggested 
by the radio’s brief lapse into an actual song by Joseph W. Stern & Company called “That 
Shakespeherian Rag.”  In this dialogue, the radio answers her ambiguous, ungrounded questions 
with sharp and disturbing visuals.  She queries, ‘“What are you thinking of?  What thinking?  
What?”’ in a vacuum of meaning, to which her radio responds, “I think we are in the rats’ 
alley/Where the dead men lost their bones” (113, 115-116).  Again she demands, ‘“Do/You know 
nothing?  Do you see nothing?/Do you remember Nothing?”’ and the radio replies, “I 
remember/Those are pearls that were his eyes” (125-126).  Rats in bone-filled alleys and pearls in 
eye sockets may not be particularly comforting imagery, but they have a locating effect: they give 
the reader an image, a moment, to inhabit instead of the nihilistic whirlpool of senseless 
questions.  Significantly, this sense of location is provided by the radio.  After radio delocalizes 
subjects—perhaps because radio delocalizes subjects—by nature of its invisible operatings, it then 
relocalizes subjects through verbal specificity and vivid language, which nonetheless does not 
negate the original delocalization.  We are not rerooted in our own bodies, but we are anchored in 
an image evoked by language, an image with which we engage in an embodied manner. 
New modes of relating to one’s own body and the bodies of others become crucial to this 
historical structure of feeling, and striking visual imagery fosters intersubjectivity.  In the medium 
of radio, Bliven extrapolates our sense of disorientation not only by depriving the reader of visuals 
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but also through allusions to impossible visuals.  He writes, “Friend No. 2 continues his knob-
twirling and in a moment this celestial caterwauling is shouldered aside, so to speak, by the 
Sextette, being sung in our very ears and evidently by giants a hundred feet tall” (262).  The giants 
are, in a sense, more real to us than Friend No. 2 because they are already fantastical.  
Experiencing heighted disorientation reminds readers they are already disoriented and require 
external objects to establish spatial situatedness.  In invoking the abject, radio also provides a mode 
of intimacy through proximity that relocates listeners.  It traverses boundaries without breaking 
them, like the sound waves landing on ears, alerting them to an immaterial, intimate presence.  So, 
too, the subject and object circuitously remediating one another in an electric circuit exchange 
elements of their presence without negating subjecthood and objecthood.  When subjects 
circuitously connected to networks of objects encounter other subjects circuitously connected to 
networks of objects—and objects connected to subjects—new forms of intersubjective and 
interobjective connection are possible, to be discussed in the next chapter.  
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Figure 2. Close-up of the Young Woman Meeting her Lover 
Ménilmontant. Dir. Dimitri Kirsanoff, 1926. Film 
Figure 3.  Close-up of the Young Woman After Meeting her Lover 
Ménilmontant. Dir. Dimitri Kirsanoff, 1926. Film. 	
Figure 1. The Clock and Dial 
 Ménilmontant. Dir. Dimitri Kirsanoff, 1926. Film. 	
Figure 4. Clock Gears 
Ménilmontant. Dir. Dimitri Kirsanoff, 1926. Film. 
 
Figure 5. The Clock Enmeshed with the World 
Ménilmontant. Dir. Dimitri Kirsanoff, 1926. Film. 
 
Figure 6. The Lovers’ Bodies Enmeshed with the World 
Ménilmontant. Dir. Dimitri Kirsanoff, 1926. Film. 
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Figure 7. Putrescent Goop and Flowers.  
Ménilmontant. Dir. Dimitri Kirsanoff, 1926. Film. 
 
Figure 8. Shoes on the Street 
Ménilmontant. Dir. Dimitri Kirsanoff, 1926. Film. 
 
Figure 9. Shoes on the Garbage Pile 
 Ménilmontant. Dir. Dimitri Kirsanoff, 1926. Film. 
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CHAPTER TWO: 
 
COMPLETING THE CIRCUIT: RECIPROCITY IN SUBJECT-OBJECT RELATIONSHIPS 
 
The Inadequacy of Verbal Communication and the Necessity of Things 
Chapter One traced the lineage of an idea: society’s horror and fascination with subjects 
becoming objects and objects becoming subjects in the early twentieth century.  It acknowledged 
the Marxist tendency to frame humans and objects in an oppositional relationship and offered an 
alternative mode of viewing the relationship between subject and object as an electrical circuit in 
which one reconstitutes the other, a mode exemplified by the manner in which subjects relate to 
enchanted objects in film and poetry from this era.  From there, the discussion turned to the 
relationship between these enchanted objects and the magic show, detailing how this relationship 
at times plunges into the abject as the self becomes entangled with a sentient, at times invasive, 
world of objects.  Radio and the electrical circuits that govern it offer a framework for 
understanding subject-object relationship, playing a sylleptical role in the cultural conscious, 
invoking the abject to foster intersubjective and interobjective connetions via technology.  
Chapter Two invokes thing theory and the writings of French Impressionist theorists to 
bring all of this to bear on intersubjectivity and interobjectivity.  T.S. Eliot, Dimitri Kirsanoff, and 
Jean Epstein were part of a cultural impetus that sought to understand the subject through the 
object and vice versa, and we see how they use enchanted objects and bodies as objects to bring the 
audience into the subject’s world as the audience remediates the object as well.  Examining not 
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only the reciprocal relationship between subject and object but also invoking vital materialist Jane 
Bennett’s conception of “assemblages” allows us to theorize what we can and cannot know about 
the other, as well as how to gain this understanding.  Furthermore, Vivian Sobchack’s 
understanding of intersubjective and interobjective relationships provides a framework for expressing 
how elements within and between assemblages might approach each other.  She emphasizes the 
capacity for the subject to experience itself as an object, writing that our ability to recognize the fact 
we are both objective subjects (a subject who senses its status as object) and subjective objects (an object 
capable of subjectivity).  Sobchack connects “sense-ability”, or sensory awareness (especially of the 
self as object), to “sensibility,” an aesthetic awareness linked to passion (290).  She conversely 
emphasizes the subject is “response-able,” a characteristic that “allows us the possibility of 
appreciating—and caring for—the form and substance of ‘things’ external to ourselves,” which 
makes the subject “responsible” for these things (290).  
This notion of the assemblage also frames our understanding of how subjects and 
enchanted objects relate to one another (and subjects relate to one another, and objects relate to 
one another).   In Vibrant Matter, Bennett conceives of the relationships between individual 
bodies, be they subjects or objects, as “assemblages.”  She comes across a pile of debris on a 
morning walk, consisting of items like dead rats and plastic gloves and remarks on its singularity. 
The items in such an assemblage appear “as vivid entities not reducible to the contexts in which 
(human) subjects set them, never entirely exhausted by their semiotics” (5).  In short, she sees the 
objects as beautiful because of how they are set in relation with one another, an assemblage wherein 
each actant’s existence is not predetermined by human judgments concerning, for instance, its 
usefulness or role to humans.  Bennett extends this argument by naming the ways in which 
 59 
“inorganic matter can ‘self-organize,”’ making the case that objects have a sort of agency in these 
assemblages (6).  She writes of an “energetic vitality” they share, which she later frames as “live 
presence” (5).  Some immaterial life force connects the items in the assemblage without 
discounting their material existence. 
The assemblage is an essential concept because it points to a concept of non-identity.  For 
instance, the dead rat in Bennett’s assemblage is known to most human subjects as one sort of 
thing—an undesirable carrier of filth and pestilence.  But placed in that assemblage, it circumvents 
that false identity.  It is a dead rat unlike any other, occupying this space and time alongside other 
items that also inform the human perception of the rat, forming what Bennett terms a “contingent 
tableau” (5).  A dead rat on a metal table in a science lab would be part of a different set of 
relationships.  Therefore, the rat—or the glove, the bottle cap, the stick—are presented as not 
already known to the human subject, and their coming together is likewise a singular assemblage.  
Bennett connects this understanding of the singularity of things to Theodor Adorno’s claim that, 
“it was not possible to ‘unseal’ or parse a concept into its constituent parts: one could only ‘circle’ 
around a concept, perhaps until one gets dizzy or arrives at the point at which nonidentity with the 
real can no longer be ignored” (31).  Adorno is emphasizing the impossibility of perfect, immediate 
communication of a concept; ideas cannot be “unsealed” in this manner, but instead must be 
described until the recipient of the communication understands that there is no knowable center 
of subjecthood and he or she can only approach intersubjectivity and interobjectivity by 
approximations.   
For Bennett, this means that agency is distributive rather than belonging to any single 
agent in an assemblage.  Our attempts to “get at” the individual subject or object are futile—
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instead, attention to the rest of the assemblage is revelatory of the subject and object (without 
fostering the illusion that everything can be revealed).  The kaleidoscopic object worlds of Eliot, 
Kirsanoff, and Epstein provide us with such a circumlocution.  The communicative objects 
surrounding their speakers and characters acknowledge the impossibility of true and full 
knowledge of and through these subjects and objects.  Instead they offer us a mode for seeking self-
disclosure and knowledge of the other.  In looking at the assemblages of subjects and objects, we 
know something about these characters and their worlds—and that something shows us that there 
is still much we do not know. 
An understanding of how assemblages support a concept of nonidentity.  This transforms 
our reading of Prufrock, changing him from a subject who operates in a mechanized world, 
struggling to assert himself, to a figure who reveals the impossibility of true immediacy in 
communication.  Nonetheless, he conveys a complex assemblage of objects that ‘“circle’ around a 
concept” of his being.  In the examples under discussion in this paper—Prufrock, Coeur Fidele, 
Ménilmontant, The Chute de la maison Usher, The Wasteland—love and its abuses reappear as a context 
in which inadequate personal expression gives rise to dislocation of the subject and relocation in 
the object world.  This may be because the experience of romantic love gives rise to bodily desire 
for another person, and that desire reminds the subject of her own body.  Rejection from the 
beloved furthermore reminds the subject of distance, of the lack of connection between bodies 
and subjectivities. 
Sobchack views another sense of the word “passion”—both its devotion and suffering 
components—as the catalyst that provokes one to examine the apparent boundaries between 
subject and object, as the subject “seeks to actively grasp both a concrete sense of one’s own self as 
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immanently material and a concrete sense of how some of the world’s objects may also be subjects” 
(290).  It allows the subject to experience itself as an object (in Prufrock’s case, one he fears is 
undesirable), and therefore opens up modes of intersubjective and interobjective encounter for 
which verbal communication alone is inadequate.  
What Prufrock lacks, and craves, is the ability to convey his interior world to another 
person.  His attempts to build interpersonal connection through language have been insufficient, 
underscored by the contrast between the simplicity of the poem’s dialog and the abstraction of 
Prufrock’s internal musings, which indicates his vast interior world is far from externalized.  He 
imagines the women responding to his romantic advances with a dismissive, “That is not it at 
all,/That is not what I meant, at all” (109-110).  What “it” refers to, what they actually meant in 
the first place, is ambiguous in its brevity.  Prufrock cannot express himself either.  He compares 
the difficulty of putting a question into words to “[squeezing] the universe into a ball” (93).  
Variations of the two questions, “How should I begin?” and “How should I presume?” occur 
throughout the poem.  At one point, Prufrock considers a possible response: “Shall I say, I have 
gone at dusk through narrow streets/And watched the smoke that rises from the pipe/Of lonely 
men in shirt-sleeves leaning out of windows?...” (70-71).  This image evokes Prufrock’s loneliness 
and fear of remaining among these lonely men, but his actual phraseology is attentive to the 
objects present in the scene: the narrow streets, the smoke, the pipes, the shirtsleeves, the 
windows.  Each of these objects conveys the particulars of Prufrock’s mental state—pipe smoke 
escaping through open windows is a much more multi-layered mood than “lonely.”  Thus, the 
object-laden associations that actually form Prufrock’s inner workings clash with the imprecise but 
socially acceptable words he could use to express himself.  He cannot achieve intersubjectivity or 
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interobjectivity through language, but he can experience himself in an assemblage with these 
objects and mix up his own identity with the object world, aware of his status as a subjective object 
and objective subject.  Thus he conveys the whole of his assemblage to readers, inviting us to 
understand him intersubjectively and interobjectively. 
Prufrock’s greatest fear is being “[fixed] in a formulated phrase,” which he likens to being 
“pinned and wriggling on the wall” by a sea of eyes (56, 58). Bennett, too, warns against our 
tendency to pin down the subject as one thing or another, rather than viewing him or her as 
entangled in an assemblage.  But as Bennett observes, we cannot simply negate our tendency to 
conceptualize subjects.  Instead, she writes, “The goal here is to become more cognizant that 
conceptualization automatically obscures the inadequacy of its concepts…we must develop a concept 
of nonidentity to cure the hubris of conceptualization” (15).  In calling for a “concept of 
nonidentity,” Bennett recognizes that we seek the solidity of conceptualization as opposed to the 
vacuum of nonidentity.  Without concepts of another’s subjectivity to anchor our experience of 
them, we can only conceive of Prufrock as an unknowable, black hole of identity.  On the other 
extreme, when our conceptualization hubristically claims, “We have accessed the core of this 
subject’s personhood!” we fail to acknowledge the inadequacy of this understanding.  So Bennett 
offers us another mode: the assemblage.  We look at the objects around Prufrock that circuitously 
constitute his subjectivity as his subjectivity constitutes them, and as we watch the exchange 
happening in the circuit we can glimpse fleeting strands of Prufrock without presuming to grasp 
his whole.   
T.S. Eliot was self-aware of his use of objects in his poetry to represent the interior worlds 
of characters, and he wrote about these subject-object relationships in essays such as “Knowledge 
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and Experience” (1964).  As William Skaff notes, Eliot criticized the use of emotion words in 
poetry and instead advocated the utility of objects to convey the interior states of subjects, hence 
his notion of the objective correlative (which, recall from the introduction, is Eliot’s theory that a 
group of objects can serve as a formula for a given emotion).  Just as Prufrock grapples with the 
inadequacy of language, Skaff paraphrases Eliot in saying, “[Philosophy and poetry that are ‘verbal’] 
treat emotions as objects in themselves and rely upon the use of such abstractions of the excitation 
of the indefinite emotion rather than for the expression of precise emotion stirred by a particular 
sensory experience” (Skaff 158).  According to Eliot, the mind has a tendency to separate the 
component parts of emotional encounters with objects into descriptions of the emotions produced 
in these moments.  These emotion words then become objects in their own right and lose their 
resonance with the original encounter. 
Eliot’s understanding of subject-object relationships has some overlap with my own 
circuitous formulation of that experience.  In “Knowledge and Experience,” Eliot notes how a 
subject viewing an emotionally moving painting experiences that painting as ‘“a constitutent of 
[their] consciousness or [their] soul”’ (Skaff 159).  This subject’s “‘whole of feeling’ tends to 
‘expand into object’” (Skaff 159).  In many ways this is analogous to my notion of the circuit 
linking subjects and objects: both feature subjects and objects reaching into one another and 
reconstituting each other.  However, Eliot believes there is a finite center to the subject and object 
as they unite.  Eliot suggests a more radical coupling of subject and object, which Skaff explains as 
“that unity of sensory experience, logic, and emotion,” and Eliot believed such a dynamic would 
give poetry the illusion of life (159).  I, instead, wish to emphasize that subjecthood has no such 
center, and instead the subject may only be known through its relationships with other agents in 
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assemblages.  In this model, Prufrock is in an assemblage with his enchanted objects, an 
assemblage in which subjects and objects reconstitute one another without becoming one and the 
same entity. 
Eliot points to the inadequacy of the formulated phrase, and I contend the assemblage—
and our recognition of it—is the antidote to the limitations of language.  When Prufrock exclaims 
at last, “It is impossible to say just what I mean!/ But as if a magic lantern threw the nerves in 
patterns on a screen,” he recognizes something about the filmic world that holds the answer to his 
conundrum of self-expression (104-105).  That something is the visual quality of film and its 
attention to the object world.  Film can map out Prufrock’s metaphorical neural network through 
assemblages of objects representing the diffuse, ambiguous associations that constitute subjecthood 
and objecthood.  Eliot’s filmic poem, also visual, associative, and object-laden, uses the same 
method.   
The poem’s filmic qualities are furthermore revealed through the manner in which Eliot 
directs readers to view these objects in association with one another.  This builds on the assertions 
of critics like David Trotter, who notes the importance of the close-up in Eliot’s poems.  Trotter 
cites the moment when Prufrock describes the women’s arms, noting, “The circle of illumination 
within which the light brown hair on a white arm appears in alluring close-up might make us think 
of the cinema. Such close-ups…played in an important part in some of the earliest narrative films” 
(Trotter 244).  The close-up is indeed filmic, and the manner in which Eliot’s many close-ups are 
connected in assemblages is also filmic.  One example of such an assemblage appears when 
Prufrock considers descending the stair, and he feeds us a succession of images: “With a bald spot 
in the middle of my hair—/(They will say: “How his hair is growing thin!”)/My morning coat, my 
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collar mounting firmly to the chin, my necktie rich and modest, but asserted by a simple pin—” 
(40-43).  The poem insistently directs readers to look at one object at a time, as if watching a 
montage.  The objects are generally proximate to one another, suggesting a camera is roving over 
one at a time, perhaps flickering between hair, coat, necktie, and pin with enough overlap between 
the images so we maintain a sense of contiguity.  Establishing this proximity is important to film, 
but it is not as important to poetry, which can jump around the objects of a room without the 
same risk of disorientation.  Thus, roving over the particulars of spotlighted area invokes a filmic 
mode.   
Eliot’s movement between objects furthermore brings to mind the Kuleshov Effect, a film 
theory stating that audiences naturally link two images shown in succession, conveying a message 
that supersedes the individual images.  Indeed, the montage of Prufrock’s formal wear produces 
messages like, “Prufrock is getting ready, Prufrock is insecure” through its juxtapositions.  It is a 
montage but also an assemblage.  Jean Epstein would likely agree, writing in The Intelligence of a 
Machine, “A cell is certainly a being, but a soul emerges only through a colony of cells” 
(“Intelligence 62).  Appropriately, he also invokes the mechanized, object world, writing of “a 
community of gears and pistons.”  Epstein declares, “The soul is everywhere in humans, and 
nowhere in particular.  It results from the whole organic function.  Similarly, the personal 
character of a motor does not dwell exclusively in this or that part” (“Intelligence” 63).  Even the 
structure of film itself carries out this theme, as Epstein suggests in “Magnification and Other 
Writings”: the individual slides come together to form something more alive than the sum of its 
parts when viewed by the subject, and the essence of film is in the space between frames (22-23). 
 66 
Several critics have compared the rhythm of The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock to a waltz, 
and I would add that it is a waltz from a music box.  This is revelatory in our context because 
music boxes form auditory assemblages. When a music box plays, the contrast between tone and 
silence is more sharply distinguished than with many other instruments because of the clarity of 
the chimes.  The notes are staggered so that a succession of individual notes is punctuated by a 
chord, and in listening to a music box, one follows a clear melody but is surprised by these 
harmonizing notes.  Often the tones that form a chord are slightly offset from each other, 
intensifying the effect.  Eliot’s rhymes resemble these punctuating chords, with distinctly separate 
notes functioning in harmony in a manner that recalls an assemblage or montage, producing an 
effect greater than the sum of its parts.  Rhymes reminiscent of these chores form an assemblage in 
the opening three lines, “Let us go then, you and I,/When the evening is spread out against the 
sky/Like a patient etherized upon a table,” link I, sky, and etherized.  This third (and internal) 
rhyme produces an unexpected harmony that seems vaguely out of place; it is brief, like an 
additional chime, but this arrangement emphasizes the separateness of each note/rhyme. 
Predictable couplets, on the other hand, produce a more blended tone and cadence.  Throughout 
the poem, a third rhyme often drops into place, often within a line or forming a slant rhyme, 
calling to mind the assemblage of musical notes. 
Other structures within the poem intensify the music box association.  When Eliot’s 
stanzas end without resolution, as in the repetition of “how should I presume,” it is if the music 
box has been prematurely closed before finishing its musical phrase.  Towards the end of the 
poem, we even hear the music box’s unwinding become slow and labored.  Cacophonic tongue 
twisters in the final stanzas impede the pace of the poem, especially when read aloud.  Lines such 
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as, “I have seen them riding seaward on the waves/Combing the white hair of the waves blown 
back/When the wind blows the water white and black” and phrases like “sea-girls wreathed with 
seaweed red and brown” require careful enunciation (126-128, 130).  We hear the music box 
slowing with the same melancholy inconclusiveness in terms of sound effects and thematic content 
that actual music boxes call to mind in the tinkling of their final notes. 
The music box association is pertinent here also because it is a quintessential enchanted 
object: it moves on its own at prompting of mechanical gears, which are often visible and 
showcased beneath the glass.  These gears remind us of the box’s objecthood, but when the 
apparatus produces music, not only does it move (as if it is alive), but also produces music, 
implying the box possesses sensibilities towards beauty and emotion (as if it is human).  The music 
box therefore emphasizes both the mechanical and emotive qualities that Prufrock himself 
conjoins.  The moments of silence between notes in a music box are like the gaps between subjects 
and objects, across which reaches a sense of presence akin to the still echoing music notes in the 
music box and still resonant rhymes in the poem.   
These gaps are essential.  There is a temptation to view living matter as either simply 
imbued with an immaterial life force or simply a material body, but this is a false dichotomy that 
denies the presence of gaps.  It is a fault akin to misrepresenting Prufrock as merely at the mercy of 
mechanical forces, an incomplete perspective discussed in Chapter One.  Bennett’s approaching to 
mediating these two extremes is useful here.  In Bennett’s chapter titled “Neither Vitalism nor 
Mechanism,” she criticizes the faulty dichotomy that would potentially see Prufrock in strictly 
mechanical or emotive terms, a split between the belief in vitalism (the belief that the spark of life 
was something completely outside the mechanical world of cells and bodies), and an emphasis on 
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the purely mechanical functioning of organisms that views matter as passive.  Bennett takes the 
best elements of the two approaches and conjoins them as a vital materialist, emphasizing the 
intersubjective and interobjective movement of this presence though the material objects in play. 
By extension, Prufrock is properly viewed in relation to his assemblage of enchanted 
objects, and following Bennett, one then recognizes that “the task becomes to identify the contours 
of the swarm and the kind of relations that obtain between its bits” (32).  In the case of Prufrock, 
the swarm is the universe Prufrock attempts to squeeze into a ball, composed of enchanted objects 
that in their lifelike qualities take center stage and prevent the reader from formulating Prufrock.  
Each time we reach inwards to say, “Prufrock is”—seeking some articulation of his identity, we are 
flung back outwards again into teacups and neckties and peaches.  This motion brings to mind an 
image in The Wasteland, the whirlpool in section four, “Death by Water.”  The Wasteland self-
consciously throws readers into a whirlpool of signification.  The image of a whirlpool is the logical 
extension of the metaphor of seepage and barrier-crossing, both abject images, previously 
associated with the dislocated self reaching beyond the body.  Self and world, subject and object, 
appear to blend together, but the focus on the material components of these objects maintains a 
degree of separation. 
This blending does not actually negate the boundaries between items in the assemblage if 
considered with the framework of radio mentioned in the aforementioned chapter: subjects and 
objects in an assemblage share a sense of presence, akin to radio waves, sound waves, or electricity, 
that can pass through the material without denying the distinction between actants.  This 
distinction is comparable to the semipermeable membrane of a cell wall: Prufrock shares some 
essential qualities of himself with the objects in his immediate proximity and they with him, the 
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quality Richard Abel calls an “astral body” (Abel 21), and what Bennett calls “an energetic vitality,” 
“live presence,” and “thing power” (4, 3).  At the same time, separation of self from world is crucial 
for the existence of life.  On the cellular level, nuclei, mitochondria, etc. must be encased by a 
semipermeable membrane.  In the case of cells and assemblages, if there is no membrane, there is 
no life.  The problem is not the existence of separation but the denial of it.   Things are revealed to 
have a central unknowability when they are properly viewed as situated within their assemblages, 
and recognition of the unknowability leads to a more honest and ethical form of intersubjectivity 
and interobjectivity because it admits a sense of non-identity. 
Eliot’s depiction of a speaker who laments the inadequacy of language brings to mind 
Antonin Artaud’s assertion that cinema emerged just when language was losing symbolic power in 
the early twentieth century.  He writes, “La pensée claire ne nous suffit pas. Elle situe un monde 
usé jusqu’à l’écœurement. Ce qui est clair est ce qui est immédiatement accessible, mais 
l’immédiatement accessible est ce qui sert d’écorce à la vie” (Artaud).  (“Clear thought will not 
suffice.  It situates us in a world worn out to the point of nausea.  What is clear is what is 
immediately accessible, but the immediately accessible is what serves to strip life.”)1  Clear, direct, 
literal language aims to tell us the facts of the world, or of a person, in simple terms, but its very 
simplicity strips away the actual texture of life formed in these complex assemblages. 
What film offers us is a concept of nonidentity through its objectivity, allowing us to see all 
the objects in relation to one another in the same instant – an objectivity that necessarily blurs 
humans and objects. Such objectivity can seem mechanistic, making subjects feel as if their own 
bodies are objects because of how they function on screen.  As Chapter One elucidated, Epstein 
argued that film could dislocate us from our secure notions of time and scale through its 																																																								
1 My translation. 
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mechanical elements, like the ability to play time forwards and backwards.  For instance, a person 
can demolish a wall on film, appearing to have mastery of the wall, but running the film backwards 
estranges the audience from the worker’s movements and makes these motions seem not so 
different from the movements of the inanimate, demolished wall that suddenly springs back into 
one block.  So, too, in Prufrock, elements like passive voice and a tinkling rhyme scheme seem 
depersonalized and mechanistic, like an unwinding a music box, but the evoke an assemblage of 
associations. 
Eliot, among other modernist poets, returns readers to the visceral realities of human 
bodies not simply for the sake of estrangement but, as Sobchack puts it, to make these bodies into 
“sense-making sites” (190).  French Impressionist filmmakers had their own techniques for 
remanding viewers to the characters’ physical bodies and the subjectivities that inhabit them.  
These films draw the audience into the characters’ inner worlds through the immediacy of the 
close-up.  Relatively static figures, shot from the shoulders up, compel audiences to attend to 
minute facial movements. Epstein himself wrote, “The close-up is the soul of the cinema.  It can be 
brief. …Even more beautiful than a laugh is the face preparing for it” (“Magnification” 9).  The 
close-up’s capacity to direct attention to details—the crinkling eyes before the laugh—sensitizes us.  
It is as if the volume on a stereo has been turned up all the way so the sound of crickets chirping 
deafens the ears.  Seeing a face filling a whole movie screen already evokes a sense of the character 
expanding, an experience that is a sympathetic cousin to the horror we feel when watching a film 
like “The Big Swallow.”  We are attentive to the slightest bodily movements, allowing us to depart 
from focus on narrative to delve deeply into the character.  Richard Abel writes of French 
Impressionism, “Here the cinema served as a medium for the expression of the subjective, the 
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interior life of a character, as an integral part of the narrative,” and the close-up foregrounded that 
interior life (20).  Yet the presence of the character on screen expands further through a series of 
objects that extend that character’s consciousness.  Using these methods, French Impressionist 
filmmakers were able to invite audiences into the character’s inner world.   
 In the medium of the silent film, not only was language inadequate—it was impossible.  
The only recourse for a linguistically inclined director was the use of intertitles, but otherwise all 
sentiments had to be conveyed through bodies and assemblages.  Kirsanoff presents the narrative 
of Ménilmontant largely through close-ups of characters’ faces intercut with shots of enchanted 
objects, and one scene comes to mind as a moment when verbal communication would be 
inadequate even if the sound technology were available.  Kirsanoff furthermore chose to omit 
intertitles, meaning the narrative must be constructed through these facial expressions.  After the 
younger sister has been betrayed by her lover and sister, she sits on a park bench with her infant 
and thinks of the comforts of home, imagining water filling a bathtub, the warm bathwater 
contrasting with the stream of condensation coming from her mouth.  A man sits beside her, 
eating bread and sausage with downcast eyes.  Throughout the entirety of their interaction, the two 
remain in separate frames.  They no doubt exist in an assemblage with one another, but one that 
intentionally cuts them off from one another through visual cues.  There are two exceptions: the 
immaterial condensation of their breath that passes between the frames and a single mediating 
enchanted object, the bread and meat the man passes to the young woman.  Because his face is 
obscured by his moustache and hat, she is all the more spotlighted.  No verbal communication is 
necessary: The infant in her arms conveys her situation, and the meal on his lap conveys his.  He 
eats his meal on a newspaper and carves his scanty portion of meat with a pocketknife.  She steals 
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glances, looks ashamed, looks back again, then buries her hand between the buttons of her coat 
front, as if trying to touch and lessen her hunger.  First he sets the bread between them.  She does 
not respond.  Then he adds a slice of meat.  She takes a deep breath, eyes contracting in grief and 
appreciation, before her hand enters the frame his has already vacated.  He continues eating, face 
obscured by his hat and moustache.  She looks at her meal’s benefactor out of the side of her eyes, 
defensive that she should be in such a position, poignantly grateful, and once more saddened by 
the gratitude because it points to her destitution.  Just when she is least able to communicate, the 
interposition of a meal points to the intersubjective forces connecting the young woman to the 
stranger on the bench, an interaction that is the product of the bodily response of facial 
expressions and the enchanted object between them. 
 The importance of the close-up in this scene and elsewhere highlights the body’s role as an 
intermediary between the centrally unknowable subject and the rest of the world.  This interplay 
between the body and enchanted objects is further explored in the section that follows. 
Bodies: Communicative and Communicable  
 If language dissociates, subjecthood is a whirlpool, and objects consistently point us back to 
nonidentity, what role does a subject’s own body play in mediating the relationship between self 
and world?  Is the body a channel for communication?  Is it an extension of immaterial 
subjecthood?  Is it just another object?   In her book Carnal Thoughts, Vivian Sobchack addresses 
the ambiguities of bodily locatedness, particularly in her chapter “Is Any Body Home?”  Sobchack 
appears to agree with Marx that our bodies are “increasingly lived as ‘things’ to be seen, managed, 
and mastered” (182).  According to Sobchack, the more we see our bodies, the less we feel 
ourselves as present in them—we treat them like objects to be taken care of the same way we take 
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care of our homes.  The increased availability of printed materials, proliferation of travel logs and 
sources other global, and, of course, the eventual rise of cinema created a visual culture in the 
latter half of the nineteenth century that Jean-Louis Comolli called “the frenzy of the visible,” a 
term which Sobchack likewise references (Comolli 122).  Sobchack recognizes that this visible 
frenzy taught the subject to conceive of his body as a visible entity rather than a felt entity. 
Sobchack responds to this frenzy with the suggestion that society does not need to stop the 
images from multiplying but instead needs to recognize their non-visible substance, a vitality like 
the one Bennett describes that is rooted in material existence but is not simply material.  Sobchack 
recounts how her own experience of having a leg amputated made her more aware of her body, 
such as when she had to relearn how to walk and felt a sense of méconaissance with the body she 
saw struggling in the mirror, an object that confronted her with the image of her body so her body 
itself felt more distant.  The only way she could relearn how to walk was by pulling back from the 
image in the mirror and actively feeling herself within own body.  She posits, “In a paradoxical 
way, then, we are most ‘at home’ in our bodies when we are most absent from them—that is, when 
they ground us in the world as a transparent capacity for significant action and sensible meaning” 
(189).  Sobchack builds on Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s statement, ‘“My body is the fabric into which 
all objects are woven, and it is, at least in relation to the perceived world, the general instrument of 
my ‘comprehension’” to name bodies as “sense-making sites” (190).  In this statement, both 
Sobchack (and Merleau-Ponty) underscore that situatedness in one’s own body comes from a 
recognition of its materiality and how it materially encounters objects and subjects, and not simply 
on a visual plane.  
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In the poems and films under discussion, physical distortion or distorted views of bodies 
frequently estrange characters and audiences from their own bodies.  This principle applies to the 
close-ups of communicative hands from Ménilmontant discussed in Chapter One, as well as literal 
disfigurement or suffering, which can also indicate the body becoming an object.  In these works, 
women especially appear as silenced figures who must communicate through other, often 
supernatural, means, which frequently has a bodily dimension.  T.S. Eliot invokes the haunting 
story of Philomela, originally from Ovid’s Metamorphoses, several times throughout The Wasteland.  
In this myth, Philomela is raped by her sister’s husband, the king Tereus, who also cuts out her 
tongue so she cannot tell her sister what happened.  But Philomela is able to communicate what 
happened through objects by weaving a tapestry to tell the story.  In the end, Philomela and her 
sister punish Tereus by killing his son and serving the boy to the king for dinner before all three 
are transformed into birds.  Philomela becomes a nightingale, which Eliot references by peppering 
poem with the onomatopoeia “Jug Jug,” an Elizabethan representation of the bird’s song.   
This paper will consider the Philomela motif in relative isolation, although it is worth 
nothing the broader gendered components of the works under discussion.  Many of these texts 
specifically feature women whose bodies are treated as objects, whose dislocated consciousnesses 
reach outside their bodies to communicate, who suffer the violence of language when that 
language lacks a concept of non-identity.  Furthermore, the experience of the abject is particularly 
associated with the female body and the act of child bearing, suggesting that there is a reason why 
these suffering female figures emerge in the discourse on subject-object barrier crossings.  Though 
such a discussion is a logical extension of the topics addressed in this paper, it lies beyond the 
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scope of this work and invites further consideration at a later date.  For the moment, I will confine 
the discussion to an examination of Philomela. 
Rape, the removal of a tongue, cannibalism, and transmogrification constitute four serious 
bodily violations in this myth, each an experience of the abject, and The Wasteland is populated 
with characters who are raped, silenced, or whose mouths have been deformed.  For instance, Part 
III, “The Fire Sermon,” tells the gruesome details of a woman’s rape through the perspective of the 
mythological Tiresias, whose own body was violated in being changed from man to woman.  And 
in the section before, we meet two women who suffer from different bodily disfigurements that 
result from inadequate self-expression. 
In Part II of The Wasteland, “A Game of Chess,” two women’s stories are united by 
allusions to Philomela, and in these allusions, Eliot foregrounds the manner in which these 
women become estranged from their bodies as objects.  The first story critiques the opulence of 
high society as lavish substances invade a woman’s body, while her own stifled, desperate message 
literally emerges through that same body, but we never get to actually read what it says.  In the 
second, a woman’s body is metaphorically disfigured by local gossip and literally disfigured by 
unwanted pregnancies. 
At the opening of “A Game of Chess,” a woman sits on a chair like a “burnished throne” 
in a room filled with gold, jewels, and candelabra (77).  It is the epitome of modern luxury in an 
aptly suffocating way.  A cloud of “strange synthetic perfumes,/Unguent, powdered, or liquid—
troubled, confused,/And drowned the sense in odours” (87-89).  This cloud of perfume troubling, 
confusing, drowning bystanders is a symbol of decadence, bringing to mind the refined opulence 
of modernity which becomes disgusting in its synthetic refinement, suffocating and intoxicating all 
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at once.  She, too, is dripping in jewels, decorated just like her house.  Above her is a “coffered 
ceiling” of “laquearia,” a fascinating word that refers to both decorative patterns made of wood 
and copper but also a fungus (93, 92).  Therefore this object conjoins wealth, status, and beauty 
with decay, invasion, and sickness. 
To cement the association between this woman and Philomela, a tapestry on the mantel 
depicts “the change of Philomel, by the barbarous king/So rudely forced” (99-100).  Enchanted 
objects like this one, referred to as “other withered stumps of time” (104) sympathize with the 
woman’s inability to communicate, and they seem so attentive to her that they “leaned out, 
leaning, hushing the room enclosed” while ominous footsteps resound on the staircase (106).  At 
this moment, “her hair/Spread out in fiery points/Glowed into words, then would be savagely 
still” (110).  Communication has passed between the woman’s body and her enchanted objects, 
which on one level suffocate her and on another sympathize with her.  We, however, do not get to 
read the words her flaming hair spells.  We can guess that it might be the sound of the nightingale, 
“Jug Jug,” from earlier in the stanza, which would link her more closely with Philomela, but rather 
than knowing, we remain an outside observer to the silent conversation between the woman and 
her room of watchful objects (103).  We can infer, however, from the woman’s (and the tapestry’s) 
fear of the figure mounting the staircase that some sort of reenacting of Philomela’s story has taken 
place in that room. 
A second figure carries out the Philomela motif of bodily disfigurement at the hands of 
love-related violence, likewise estranged from her own body as an object.  Her name is Lil, and she 
is mentioned towards the end of “A Game of Chess,” as at least two women in a bar gossip about 
her.  (We only hear one speaker, but it is implied that the other woman or women listens 
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attentively in agreement.)  Perhaps the most disturbing aspect of the scene is how the trauma Lil 
has endured is mediated by the disdain and cruelty of the speaker.  First, we learn that Lil’s 
husband Albert has given her money to “get [her]self some teeth,” a task the speaker phrases in the 
terms one might use for grocery shopping (144).  Her continued use of pronouns and slang is 
unsetting: Albert supposedly said, “You have them all out, Lil, and get a nice set/He said, I swear, I 
can’t bear to look at you” (145-146).  The casual air the speaker ascribes to the act of removing and 
replacing teeth—“have them all out”—and the manner in which she implies the husband’s suffering 
at having to look at ugly teeth is worse than Lil’s, makes Lil’s body sound like the sort of house 
project of which Sobchack writes.  The body is an object to be beautified, not an extension of a 
person to be understood, contradicting with the ““response-able” notion of care Sobchack would 
advocate. 
The woman then reveals that Lil’s teeth most likely turned black from medicine she took 
to induce a miscarriage, which is an understandable measure since she nearly died in childbirth 
from her fifth child.  The parallels to Philomela come into focus: Lil has suffered a mouth 
deformity, which seems to be a direct result of unwanted sex.  The speaker, however, shrugs off 
Lil’s suffering by saying, “What you get married for if you dont want children?” and insinuates she 
could take Albert off Lil’s hands (164).  Lil is also like Philomela in that she cannot speak for 
herself in this passage, as we receive all this information through an unkind secondary source.  The 
additional verbal violence Lil suffers at the hands of these women—compounding her profound 
physical trauma—is a realization of Prufrock’s fear of being “[fixed] in a formulated phrase” (56).  
Lil has been formulated, but the haunting images of her objectified body—the black teeth to be 
replaced like light bulbs in a house, the reproductive organs these other women believe she is 
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obligated to use—communicate a figure for whom we can feel great empathy despite the limiting 
language of these gossiping bystanders. 
Antonin Artaud claimed that cinema’s primary function was not storytelling but rather 
exploring the depths of human consciousness, and in defending this position, he emphasized its 
capacity to reveal the “occult life” of human consciousness.  In his 1927 “Sorcellerie et Cinéma,” 
he writes, “Le cinéma est essentiellement révélateur de toute une vie occulte avec laquelle il nous 
met directement en relation…Mais cette vie occulte, il faut savoir la deviner. Il y a beaucoup mieux 
que par un jeu de surimpressions à faire deviner les secrets qui s’agitent dans le fond d’une 
conscience.”  (“Cinema essentially reveals a whole occult life, with which it puts us directly in 
connection. … But one must know how to perceive that occult life.  It is so much better to 
understand the secrets that act at the bottom of a consciousness by way of a game of 
superimpositions.”)2  Artaud does not claim that film creates a fictitious occult life but rather that 
it reveals a magical dimension already existent.  This magic, in his view, is much more about 
understanding a character’s interior world than it is about speculating about the existence of 
spirits.   
However, parallels between the study of subjectivity and that of magic go deep.  It is a short 
step from contemplating the unseen forces of the brain to speculating about other unseen forces, 
and the metaphors that already exist in disciplines related to magic lend a vocabulary and a mode 
of visualization to those who wish to study the human mind.  The magic show became is an outlet 
for participants to think metaphorically, associatively, and imagistically.  The popularity of cultural 
forms like the séance and the circus in the early twentieth century evidences an interest in the 
immaterial and (in)visible, in both the extension of one’s own body and the potential for contact 																																																								
2 My translation. 
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with other dislocated bodies (ghosts, astral projections, etc.).  For filmmakers like Jean Epstein, 
literal magic was a convenient vehicle for depicting the immaterial on film. Richard Abel likewise 
touches on this idea, stating, “The camera turned certain actors, for instance, into ‘astral bodies’ 
whose essence was delivered up to the spectator in a direct, intimate, and profound encounter” 
(21).  The phrase “astral bodies” brings to mind the supernatural feat of astral projection, and thus 
the discipline of magic provides a vocabulary for the discussion of subjecthood.  These astral 
bodies on film are conveyed through a Comollian frenzy of visible images, but their materiality 
points to the immaterial, astral qualities that Sobchack underscores. 
In Epstein’s La Chute de la maison Usher, the pretext of supernatural happenings allows 
Epstein to simultaneously address how the “astral,” dislocated subject circuitously inhabits objects 
in magic and in film.  This happens most clearly in the scene when Roderick Usher 
unintentionally transfers his sister and lover Madeline’s life to his two-dimensional painting.  The 
painted image attains a curious lifelike quality, while the flesh and blood Madeline wanes behind 
him, eventually falling dead (or so Roderick believes).  The sequence is captured by a series of 
close-ups, alternating between the obsessive Roderick and increasingly insubstantial Madeline, and 
her relatively static expression of agony is magnified by a set of enchanted objects—the candles the 
portrait, the curtains—surrounding her, objects that in which her dislocated subjecthood relocates. 
 Madeline is caught up in these objects as she occupies several metaphorical in-between 
zones: Is she Roderick’s lover or sister?  Is she alive or is she dead?  Is she in her body or in the 
painting?  As her head lolls upwards at the beginning of the sequence, her dress and posture blend 
in with the drooping curtains in the background.  She appears ghostly behind the bright white 
candles, the tilt of her head angled like the semi-transparent candle flames.  It is as if she, too, is a 
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candle, burning shorter and shorter, until her half her substance has escaped into the air (her 
immaterial self) and half is spent in a pool on the ground (her body).  The way her head swings 
around like a flame and her shoulders become round as if melting completes the visual resonance.  
There is an absolute excess of candle wax cascading off the pedestal in beaded lines, the low-angle 
shot making the lines appear to cling to the edges like skeletal fingers, as if Madeline is clinging to 
life.  She has been so thoroughly transubstantiated by these objects, which expand on the subtle 
facial communication of her close-up, that even when Madeline is not in the frame we see the 
candles and think Madeline (Figure 10).  
Not only is Madeline represented by objects, but also her own body begins to blur in a 
series of superimpositions, calling to mind Artaud’s praising of “[understanding] the secrets that 
act at the bottom of a consciousness by way of a game of superimpositions.”  She wears a watch on 
her necklace, and the pendular motion of her manifold, superimposed heads in Figure 11, makes 
both body and object synchronously gesture to the passage of time, a motif that later in the film 
seems to suggest Roderick’s immanent doom.  At one moment, a statue of Madeline is also layered 
over her living face (Figure 12), eventually to replace it entirely (Figure 13) as if she has calcified 
into stone.  Clearly, Epstein is suggesting she Madeline is sinking into death. 
Many visual details complement this suggestion of death, but more unsettling are the 
reminders of Madeline’s abject state between life and death.  The greasy texture of the globular oil 
paint seems all the more repulsive on the black and white film, appearing to be a palette of 
indistinguishable tar reminiscent of the putrescent black goop from Ménilmontant in Figure 7.  
Such details return the audience to Kristeva’s notion of the abject, reminding them of the 
unpleasant barrier-crossings that can happen when the dislocated subject blurs self and world, and 
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there is a vague suggestion of unnatural preservation through the tar-like paint.  The very medium 
of paint is evocative of the “blurriness” of selfhood, as the painted figure slowly emerges on the 
canvas, and the solvents used to thin paint are cousins of those used in the embalming of bodies.  
This gesturing towards death, and towards a state between life and death, is an outcropping of 
subject-object relationships.  The fear of death is the fear of becoming an object.  In death, the 
body literally becomes a thing, not a person, and the thought of this complete violation of the 
body it is the root of all other fears of contamination.   
In this scene, Madeline is relocated in all sorts of objects—candles, clocks, curtains—that 
point towards death, but in death, Madeline does not simply become the typical notion of an 
object.  Instead, as her body appears to become an object, she is uncannily relocated in another 
object that is now brought to life.  Within her portrait, Madeline is still alive, although the exact 
quality of this life is unclear.  The intertitles explain, “A chaque coup le portrait s’animait 
d’advantage, mais Madeline pâlissait plus.  La jeune femme semblait donner à l’image peinte les 
forces qu’elle perdait.”  (“At each stroke the portrait became more alive, but Madeline grew paler.  
The young woman seemed to give to the painted image the forces that she lost.”)3  There is a 
transfer of some sort of “force,” which does not escape into the ether but rather is fixed on the 
canvas, which in some moments is swapped out with an actual mirror.  The two-dimensional 
Madeline watches the candle flames that flicker nearby, the shape of the flames blending into the 
shape of the picture frame.  She even blinks at the stubby candles, and we sense the transfer is 
complete.  Madeline has become relocated in this assemblage of objects. 
While in this moment Madeline seems utterly powerless, wasting away at the hand of the 
mad painter who transfers her life to the canvas, she is, in other regards, oddly powerful because 																																																								3	My translation. 
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there is strength in her interobjectivity.  It calls to mind what Bill Brown suggests about a child and 
his toy dummy: objects can “ventriloquize us” (“How to do Things” 947).  It is not merely the 
subject that constitutes the object, but the object, in turn, reconstitutes the subject.  Our 
perception of the real life Madeline is indeed remediated by the object in which she is relocated, 
and in a manner that contrasts her supernatural self with her apparent passivity.  She begins the 
scene as Roderick’s model, an object to be gazed on, and Roderick petitions her to keep fulfilling 
this role even when she is in physical agony.  It is almost comical how long it takes Roderick to 
notice Madeline has collapsed on the floor in back of him, evidence of his disregard for her health.  
He only sees her when his foot eventually stumbles on her body as he steps back to admire his 
work.  But once her essence resides in the mirror-like painting, she gets to watch the people who 
think they are watching her.  Furthermore, Madeline is not simply trapped in the painting, as she 
also seems connected to the candles outside the picture frame, and as her portrait blinks 
confidently we can assume supernatural forces are at work. 
As her coffin is carried to its tomb, a long white veil trails behind, suggesting Madeline is 
not fully contained within.  The superimposition of candles over the faces of the pallbearers, some 
of whom look around agitatedly, signifies that Madeline is still present.  After the funeral, a 
terrifying storm heralds Madeline’s eventual reappearance.  When she finally returns from the 
grave her presence is magnified by the blowing white veil around streaming from her head, which 
blends into the eerie smoke and flames that enclose Roderick and his visitor, as she as subject and 
the enchanted objects that surround her cyclically intensify one another.  This Madeline does not 
appear fully alive, with her lurching movements and closed eyes, but the unusual position she 
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occupies between life and death transfixes Roderick the way her portrait did earlier.  She seems less 
knowable and therefore more powerful.   
Figures like Madeline, the opulent woman in “A Game of Chess,” and even the 
mythological Philomela grow stronger and gain the ability to communicate after suffering bodily 
disfigurements.  Like Sobchack’s amputation experience, their estrangement from their bodies 
positions them to experience their own bodies as objects, breeding a sense of interobjectivity that 
reimagines the object world as able to communicate on their behalf even when they cannot.   
Implications for Intersubjectivity and Interobjectivity 
When the subject’s own body is experienced as object with material and (in)visible 
qualities, human bodies can thus serve as intersections between self and world, and at their best 
they function as Sobchack’s “sense-making sites.”  It is like Eliot’s opulent woman who sits upon 
her burnished throne takes in the noxious perfumes and expels flaming words through her hair.  
The body is not clearly separate from the circuit that connects dislocated subject and object, but 
rather it is an often-significant locus for this intersection.  Eliot, Kirsanoff, and Epstein dramatize 
how the immaterial subject, once dislocated, can become rerooted in objects.  And this object can, 
counter-intuitively, be the subject’s own body.  It is when the body is reminded of its objecthood 
that the dislocated self returns to it as an object to inhabit.  As such it provides an intersection 
between self and world: It can be acted upon by the object world, but it can also make manifest the 
immaterial subject within, breeding forms of intersubjective and interobjective “sense-abilities” and 
“response-abilities” that foster a new notion of aesthetics and care.   
This is not to diminish the extent to which external objects can be constitutive of 
subjecthood, and Bill Brown notes how objects can perform a distinct bodily role.  In “How to do 
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Things with Things,” he quotes Gaston Bachelard’s argument on hybrid objects, which resemble my 
enchanted objects in that they seem part object and part subject, but they ultimately lack 
autonomy and function as prosthetic placeholders that anchor our interior worlds.  He writes, 
“Drawers and chests and wardrobes exist as ‘veritable organs of the secret psychological life,’ how 
they serve as a kind of phenomenological prosthesis, providing ‘images of intimacy’ without which 
‘our intimate life would lack a model’” (“How to do Things” 942).  Yes, objects can provide 
temporary “images of intimacy,” but the extent to which these are prosthetic and the extent to 
which they are living organs of the human system for establishing intimacy is an important 
distinction.   
The associations we build with objects around us cultivate a certain intimacy that makes 
our world seem more meaningful.  The things around us watch our lives, and if we treat them with 
the same spirit as the child hugging each of her toys at night, we are rewarded with the feeling that 
the things around us have some sort of stake in our existence.  The isolated Prufrock walking 
through the streets needs to see the yellow fog as a friendly animal affectionately curling up around 
the houses because otherwise sustaining empathy with no reciprocating object would be 
impossible, and he certainly finds no reciprocating object in his human world.  Brown likewise 
recognizes that often “psychic survival depends on saturating the object world with significance” 
because the physical world anchors our past, our identity, and our understanding of the world 
(Brown 941).  Brown pushes further to emphasize that things “come to have everyday lives of their 
own” (“How to do Things 945).  In harmony with Brown’s assertions, Prufrock’s fog is not merely 
a means towards psychic survival for a desperate man.  Instead, it is a more ambiguous object 
whose exact construction hints at how Prufrock himself feels.  The fact that it is yellow, which 
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seems vaguely poisonous or at least unhealthily industrial, suggests a feeling of suffocation.  He 
sees the fog “rubbing its back upon the window panes” and perhaps feels himself peering in at the 
windows, an outsider in the neighborhood (25).  For a moment, we lose Prufrock in the stanza 
altogether, further suggesting that he—and we—are seeing through its eyes.  Objects provide an 
outlet for intimacy, but they also provide actual, other bodies to inhabit. 
Once again, it becomes difficult to describe the phenomenon under discussion without 
invoking supernatural language.  Jane Bennett encountered this as well.  She acknowledges that 
her propositions regarding how humans should treat things sound perhaps too anthropomorphic, 
and she counters, “Maybe it is worth running the risks associated with anthropomorphizing 
(superstition, the divination of nature, romanticism) because it, oddly enough, works against 
anthropocentrism” (120).  She criticizes hierarchical thinking (generally with humans at the top, 
organic matter below, and inorganic matter at the bottom) and argues that the oft-cited imperative 
to “affirm human uniqueness,” going back to Kant, has a terrible history of success (12).  Objects 
are entangled with but not at the command of humans.  If we can conceive of objects interacting 
with each other, we can stop overestimating our own agency (and, by extension, supremacy).  This 
again calls to mind Epstein’s claims about the camera’s ability to offer a philosophical perspective 
by equalizing the people and objects on screen: When a film alters time or scale, perhaps playing a 
sequence backwards, the spectator is reminded of the objecthood of the actors.  When the 
hierarchy is flattened, intersubjectivity is extended into interobjectivity.  We become aware of how 
things interact with one another in a way that resembles human interactions, while humans put 
less faith in their own agency as supreme over the object world and more fully acknowledge their 
shared objecthood. 
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Bennett argues we should be open to using the language of anthropomorphosis; I argue we 
should be open to using the language of enchantment more broadly, with anthropomorphosis as 
one facet.  Enchanted objects certainly have humanlike qualities—they are sentient, watchful, and 
autonomous—but it is key that the subject observing them in a sense inhabits them.  Madeline is, 
to some extent, in the candles and manifesting through them; Marie is anchored by the tiny, 
sympathetic automaton; Prufrock views his coffee spoons as measuring out his life and death, and 
then it seems as if his life really does lie in the contours of a teaspoon.  Indulging the notion that 
objects can be enchanted makes us attentive to a sense of presence.  We tune in to the (in)visible 
substance Sobchack argues is obscured by our image culture.  This also is key to the frenzied, 
modern society of the early twentieth century.  In a world increasingly crammed with objects and 
new, dislocative technologies, the subject needed a mode of interacting with the object world 
beyond the Marxist conception of an oppositional relationship.  Instead Prufrock, Marie, 
Philomela, Madeline, and the rest model a mode of subjective expression that speaks through, 
remediates, and is remediated by the object world as they also become relocated in their own 
bodies, which they experience as objects. 
Furthermore, an attention to the ways that human identities ebb and flow in circuitous 
relationships with the objects around them promotes modes of thinking that fosters empathy 
without assuming we have a full and complete knowledge of the other. When we follow the 
motion of the circuitous relationship between subject and object, as one reconstitutes the other, 
we are also caught up in a centrifugal motion away from the subject as understood within the 
limitations of nonvisual language.  We do not conceive of the subject as one thing, but see him or 
her refracted by the kaleidoscope of enchanted objects.  Bennett notes that anthropomorphism is 
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not such a radical idea because humans already have an inflated, inaccurate conception of their 
own agency, which is as fanciful as using the language of magic, and the historical relationship 
between the metaphor of magic and the intersubjective experience corroborates the utility of this 
vocabulary.  
The consequences of this principle have implications for intersubjectivity and 
interobjectivity.  Bennett believes an awareness of assemblages shows people their stake in taking 
care of things, since everything is caught up in the same web and one part affects all the others.  It 
is also problematic to ascribe agency to individual agents.  She writes, “A moralized politics of good 
and evil, of singular agents who must be made to pay for their sins…becomes unethical to the 
degree that it legitimates vengeance and elevates violence to the tool of first resort” (38).  Taking 
agents out of assemblages leads to oversimplifications that can turn into finger-pointing, when in 
reality, assemblages have a collective agency that is not subject to the rhetoric of punishment.  
Seeing agency as collective furthermore shifts our response from fault-finding to dynamic-defining.  
J. Alfred Prufrock is not an evil figure, but he does feel victimized by a formulated phrase.  To see 
subjects like Prufrock, whether they exist in literature, in the twentieth-century context, or in 
everyday life, as a vast assemblage of many objects is to develop a healthy concept of nonidentity. 
The manner in which poetry and film responded to, depicted, and reoriented mass culture 
in the early twentieth century offers us a paradigm for cultivating intersubjectivity and 
interobjectivity.  This circuitous mode in which subjects and objects reconstitute one another 
allows for a multifaceted understanding of selfhood.  The works of Eliot, Kirsanoff, Epstein, and 
others position the audience for a more profound experience of empathy, providing them with a 
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magic lantern of sorts, and one that recognizes the limitations of that empathy as the subject is 
illuminated in patterns on the screen. 
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Figure 10. Madeline and the Candles 
La Chute de la maison Usher. Dir. Jean Epstein. 1928. Film. 
 
Figure 11. Madeline’s Pendular Motion 
La Chute de la maison Usher. Dir. Jean Epstein. 1928. Film. 
Figure 12. Madeline Blurred with the Statue 
La Chute de la maison Usher. Dir. Jean Epstein. 1928. Film. 
 
Figure 13. Madeline Becomes the Statue 
La Chute de la maison Usher. Dir. Jean Epstein. 1928. Film. 
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